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The Structure  and Performance of 
the Money Management  Industry 
IN  1990  TOTAL  FINANCIAL  assets  in U.S.  capital markets amounted to 
$13.7  trillion,  of  which  $3.4  trillion  was  equities,  and the rest were 
bonds,  government  securities,  tax-exempt  securities,  and mortgages. 
These  financial  assets  were  held by two principal types  of  investors: 
individuals and institutions.  The New York Stock Exchange defines an 
institution  as a firm that employs  professionals  to manage money  for 
the benefit of  others (firms or individuals).  At the end of  1990,  $6.1 
trillion of the total U.S.  financial assets was held by institutions.  Both 
the  amount  of  institutional  assets  and the  fraction  of  the  total  they 
represent have  increased  sharply over the past 30 years.  In 1950,  for 
example, institutional assets comprised $107 billion out of a $500 billion 
total, or 21 percent compared with 45 percent in 1990.1 The growth of 
institutional  ownership  of  equities  has paralleled  their growth in the 
ownership of other financial assets.  In 1955 institutions owned 23 per- 
cent  of  equities  compared  with  77  percent owned  by  individuals;  in 
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1990 institutions owned 53 percent and individuals 47 percent. Without 
doubt,  institutional  ownership  is  a  large  and increasingly  dominant 
feature of U.S.  financial markets. 
Perhaps the most important segment of the institutional market is the 
discretionary  tax-exempt  segment.  As  of  the end of  1990,  it had ap- 
proximately  $2.2  trillion in assets and $1 trillion in corporate equities. 
Over 90 percent of these assets belong to corporate, public,  and union 
pension funds. In turn, over 80 percent of all pension money is contained 
in defined-benefit plans, which promise employees  a pattern of benefits 
after retirement based  on  a formula that does  not depend  on the  in- 
vestment  performance  of  the  fund.  These  pension  plans  invest  their 
assets to ensure sufficient  funding of the defined benefits,  leaving  the 
plan sponsor as the residual claimant on the fund. 
In a defined-contribution plan, employees  do not get a fixed amount 
but the value of the investments that have accumulated in their pension 
plan.  Compared with  employees  in defined-benefit  plans,  they  have 
more discretion  over  how  the money  is  invested.  This  creates  some 
interesting differences  in how the money is actually invested in the two 
plans. For example, defined-benefit plans typically allocate much greater 
fractions of their assets to corporate equities other than the company's 
own stock.  Participants in defined-contribution plans typically  invest a 
large chunk of their assets  in guaranteed investment  contracts (GICs) 
that lock  in a guaranteed rate of  return. Hence,  there is  more active 
management in defined-benefit plans than in defined-contribution plans. 
Historically,  defined-benefit  plans  have  been  more  popular.  As  a 
result,  the structure of the tax-exempt  money management industry is 
largely based on the model of the corporate sponsor as residual claimant 
and decisionmaker.  In this paper we concentrate on the delegated port- 
folio  management  of  tax-exempt  funds that invest  heavily  in equities 
and choose  between  outside  managers to actively  manage their port- 
folios.  Management  of  these  portfolios  is  usually  delegated  to three 
types  of  firms: insurance companies,  banks and trust companies,  and 
investment counselors.  We will examine the structure and performance 
of this industry and make comparisons  wherever possible  to its close 
cousin,  the mutual funds industry, about which a little more is known. 
The tax-exempt money management industry manages approximately 
$2 trillion  of  retirement assets  of  U.S.  workers.  Quite aside  from its 
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participants in the pension fund industry actively pick stocks, an activity 
not predicted by standard finance models  yet enthusiastically  pursued 
by virtually  all  financial  market participants.  Analyzing  the industry 
can shed light on the behavior of traders in the stock market and perhaps 
eventually  (though not in this paper) on the behavior of  stock market 
prices.  Second,  the industry differs  from the mutual fund industry in 
one key respect. Investments in mutual funds are decided by individuals 
who allocate their own wealth. Investments in pension funds are guided 
by corporate treasurers acting for the corporation that provides benefits 
for its  employees.  The  extra layers  of  agency  problems may explain 
some  of  the most  important differences  between  the mutual fund in- 
dustry and the pension  fund industry.  Third, pension  fund managers 
have consistently  underperformed the market. It is thus an industry that 
appears to subtract rather than to add value. Nonetheless,  it has survived 
and grown. 
Our paper begins  with a description of the agency problems that we 
believe  are crucial for understanding how the money management in- 
dustry functions.  We then focus  on the performance of pension funds. 
On average they perform poorly relative to a passive  investment strat- 
egy.  Over time there is some consistency  of performance, which sug- 
gests that sponsors should look for better managers on the basis of past 
performance. Our evidence  does not suggest that past performance can 
be used to pick managers who are expected to beat a passive investment 
strategy net of management fees.  In the next section  of the paper we 
describe  the industrial organization  of the industry in light of  agency 
problems  and the elusiveness  of  good  performance.  We then look  at 
the role of the agency approach in explaining  other key features of the 
tax-exempt  money  management industry. We conclude  with a discus- 
sion of the likely  evolution  of this industry. When all is said and done, 
we doubt that an industry that has added little if any value can continue 
to exist  in its present form. 
The Agency Structure of Defined-Benefit  Plans 
A defined-benefit plan is a contractual obligation of a corporation to 
its employees  to pay a certain level  of benefits.  If a corporate pension 
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the excess  money  belongs  to the corporation.  (Sometimes,  however, 
implicit contracts with employees  lead corporations to pay out some of 
the excess  funds as extra benefits.)  If a corporate pension  plan is un- 
derfunded-does  not have enough money to pay the promised level  of 
benefits-the  shortfall becomes  the most senior claim on the corpora- 
tion. If the corporation is bankrupt, the pension plan is the most senior 
creditor,  and the  Pension  Benefit  Guarantee Corporation insures  the 
benefits if the corporation does not have enough assets.  Aside from the 
gaming incentives  in or near bankruptcy, which we will ignore,  it is in 
the interest of the corporation to ensure the highest returns on the assets 
in the pension  plan given  some  acceptable  level  of risk. 
The corporation allocates  the resources  of  its pension  plan among 
different investments.  These  allocation  decisions  are usually made by 
the corporate treasurer or someone  in that office.  Assets  are allocated 
between internal and external managers and between passive managers, 
such as index funds,  and active  managers. This allocation  decision  at 
the corporate level  gives  rise to the first relationship that we  want to 
study: the relationship between corporate management and the treasur- 
er's office  (TO).  The corporate insiders who allocate the money  must 
worry about their own jobs  and reputations.  The performance of  the 
assets  in the pension  plan will  influence  their future success  with the 
company. 
This agency relationship between the corporate management and the 
treasurer's office  has several implications.  First, the treasurer's office 
has a bias  against passive  management because  passive  management 
reduces the demand for services produced by that office and thus reduces 
the size of its empire. Those in charge of the plan must show that they 
are doing  some  work to preserve their positions.  Giving  money to an 
index fund is probably not enough.  This undoubtedly explains some of 
the preference  for active  management.  Second,  the treasurer's office 
has a bias against internal management of money  and for delegation. 
External management  may  make  good  sense  because  it  permits  the 
realization of  economies  of  scale  and allows  flexibility  to switch  be- 
tween  many  money  managers with  various  investment  styles.  In ad- 
dition,  the treasurer's office  wants to delegate  money  management in 
order to reduce its responsibility  for potentially  poor performance of 
the plan's assets.  Of course,  once the decision  to delegate money man- 
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funds between managers over time.  In practice, this becomes  the most 
important job  that it does.  Many  interesting  features of  the industry 
result from the interaction of  TOs  and the outside  money  managers. 
Even in this activity,  the treasurer's office  tries to reduce its own risk 
by hiring consulting  firms that pick  money  managers.  With all these 
safeguards,  it finds a way  to  stay busy  and at the  same time  unload 
some of the risk of poor performance. The treasurer's office can always 
replace a poorly performing money manager with a manager who has 
done well in the past and promise that future performance will be better. 
Most of the assets  in defined-benefit pension plans are managed by 
these professional  money managers who compete for money to manage. 
When  a corporation hires  one  of  them to  run some  of  its  money,  it 
either creates its own pension fund with that money manager, or it puts 
the money into one of the commingled  pension funds that the manager 
runs for  several  pension  plans.  Money  managers receive  more com- 
pensation  the  more  money  they  run.  Therefore,  they  have  a  strong 
incentive  to increase money under their management.  To compete  for 
funds,  money  managers try to offer  superior performance for a given 
level  of risk.  Most of the equity money  managers promise to beat the 
Standard and Poor's  500 Index by 200 to 400 basis points. The sponsors 
allocate  money  among money  managers based on their evaluations  of 
these  money  managers'  ability  to beat the S&P 500. 
Unfortunately,  the quality of these money managers is not perfectly 
observable,  and so  the task of  the sponsor  is  not trivial.  The money 
management industry is largely shaped by (1) the desire of the sponsors 
to achieve  superior returns through active  money  management under 
very imperfect information and (2) the competition of the money man- 
agers for sponsors'  funds by offering  products designed  to ensure su- 
perior performance.  New  money managers are typically  selected  from 
the pool of those who have outperformed the median pension manager 
in the previous  three to five years. 
The delegation  of money management to outsiders gives  rise to the 
second important relationship in that industry: the relationship between 
the sponsors and the money managers. Sponsors want to allocate money 
to managers who can beat the market since  that serves the interest of 
both the sponsor corporation and the treasurer's office that allocates the 
money.  In choosing  a manager,  sponsors have a lot of information at 
their disposal,  such  as  the  past  track record  of  the  manager,  some 344  Brookings Papers: Microeconomics 1992 
description of the techniques he uses for portfolio selection,  past track 
records of the manager's peers with similar techniques,  and many other 
characteristics of portfolios  of the manager in question.  Based on that 
information,  they allocate  funds among different managers. 
Managers have  some  control over the information that they reveal 
to the  sponsors.  In fact,  they  can manipulate that information.  They 
also can manipulate their portfolio  choices  to enhance their reputation 
with the sponsor even when such strategies are not in the best interest 
of the sponsor.  How can sponsors evaluate the quality of money man- 
agers,  and what are the consequences  of making that difficult evalua- 
tion? Those  are the principal questions  addressed in this paper. 
The Data 
SEI is a financial services company that specializes  in evaluating the 
performance  of  pension  plans  and in helping  sponsors  select  money 
managers. The empirical work in this paper is based on two databases 
from SEI: the performance database and the search database. The per- 
formance database is a sample of 769  all-equity  pension  funds run by 
341 different money  managers.  The way a pension fund gets into this 
performance database is  that a plan sponsor asks  SEI to monitor the 
performance of this fund and pays for the service.  A fund disappears 
from SEI's  database if the sponsor fires the manager or if the sponsor 
decides to use another consultant instead of SEI. As of the end of 1989, 
the performance  database covered  approximately  $124  billion  in ac- 
tively  managed tax-exempt equity funds-about  15 to 20 percent of all 
assets  in that segment  of the market. 
The performance database contains quarterly returns for each equity 
fund from the beginning  of  1983 to the end of  1989.  It also  contains 
end-of-quarter  holdings  (number of  shares) by  stock  for each  equity 
fund from the beginning of 1985 to the end of 1989. Finally, the database 
contains  information about characteristics  of the funds,  including  the 
manager's investment style.  Well-defined  investment styles play a cen- 
tral role in the money management industry. To differentiate their prod- 
uct, managers claim adherence to particular  styles and expertise. Sponsors 
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Table 1. Investment  Styles of Equity Funds by Number and Dollar Value, Average 
for Quarters 1985:1 to 1989:4a 
Percentage  of value in  funds 
Investment  Percentage  of funds  (excluding  cash) invested 
style  using  given style  according  to given style 
Growth  38  38 
Yield  15  1  1 
Value  31  30 
Other  15  21 
a. Performance  database  of 769 all-equity pension funds. 
of whom is a specialist at managing a particular type of asset according 
to a particular style. 
In the performance database there are four possible  styles:  growth, 
value,  yield,  and other.  SEI determines  the style  of  a fund based on 
objective criteria rather than on self-reporting by managers. "Growth" 
refers to a fund whose portfolio at the end of the quarter has an average 
price/earnings  (P/E) ratio in the 60th percentile  or above of the funds 
included  in the performance database.  "Value"  refers to those  funds 
with  an average  P/E ratio that is  in the 40th  percentile  or below  as 
measured against other funds on the performance database.  "Yield" 
refers to funds with an average dividend yield  that places  them in the 
80th percentile  or above of funds in the performance database. Funds 
in a given  quarter that do not fall  into these three categories  are cate- 
gorized as "other."  Table 1 shows the distribution across styles of the 
number of funds and the dollar value  of assets.  Growth is the largest 
category  (38  percent).  Yield  and value,  which are similar investment 
styles,  together represent 41 to 46 percent of the funds and money.  We 
thus have a reasonably good distribution of money managers by style, 
and we can perform many of our calculations  within style. 
Compared with the performance database,  the search database has 
certain advantages and disadvantages.  The unit of analysis  is an entire 
money  management  organization  rather than just  a particular equity 
fund managed for a given sponsor. The database covers equity products 
and fixed-income  products.  Although  it  contains  some  performance 
information from the mid-1970s,  many firms do not show up until the 
early 1980s. To get into the search database, a money management firm 
volunteers information about itself to SEI, which then decides  whether 
to include the firm in the database.  Firms want to be on this database 346  Brookings Papers: Microeconomics 1992 
because  SEI  typically  recommends  money  managers  to  its  sponsor- 
clients  from this  list.  Participation in the database does  not cost  the 
money  management firms anything; the sponsors pay. 
SEI's  decision  to  include  a firm in the  search database is  largely 
based on the amount of money under management and the track record. 
SEI's  criteria for inclusion  in the database,  combined  with the desire 
of firms to be included after a period of good recent performance, create 
a fairly significant  selection  bias for the early years when many man- 
agers were being added every year. Because  of this bias,  we focus  on 
the  performance  numbers from the  later subperiod.  SEI drops firms 
from the search database infrequently. When it does, it is because assets 
under management and performance deteriorate significantly.  We only 
have money management firms that still existed on the database in 1990. 
This creates a selection  bias for the better-performing money managers. 
Despite  this disadvantage,  the search database is unique because  it 
contains numerous characteristics of the entire money management firm. 
In particular, we  have data on performance,  total money  under man- 
agement, accounts gained and lost over the past five years, management 
fees  charged,  number of years in the business,  equity share turnover, 
and investment  style.  This type of data allows  us to extend our study 
of  performance  of  equity  funds to  a more full-blown  analysis  of  the 
structure and performance of the industry. Although the database con- 
tains historical  data on performance and accounts  gained  and lost,  it 
mostly contains cross-sectional  information on these firms as of the end 
of 1990. The database has information on approximately 350 large firms 
whose business includes tax-exempt accounts. These firms are insurance 
companies,  banks, and investment counselors  (some of which are sub- 
sidiaries of insurance or banking parents). The largest number of firms 
in the database are investment counselors.  For 1990 we have five years 
of historical equity performance data on approximately 250 firms. These 
firms managed approximately $540 billion in tax-exempt equity assets. 
This represents slightly  over half of the tax-exempt equity assets under 
external management. 
Returns-based  calculations  can be done  using  either database.  Al- 
though we rely on the data from the performance database, we present 
the results  from the  search database as a verification.  Luckily,  there 
are no  major differences  between  the  two  sets  of  results.  For some 
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that we need. When this is the case, we use that database  in our pre- 
sentation. We cannot rely on either database  for some industry-wide 
statistics. In these cases we extracted  key numbers  from  Pensions and 
Investments. 
Elusive Good Performance 
In this section we present portfolio performance  results from the 
performance  and search databases. 
Performance Evaluation: Equity Returns Before Management Fees 
We measure performance  using actual returns  before management 
fees. To mitigate  any  problems  associated  with  finding  the  proper  bench- 
mark  against  which to compare  the returns,  we look at the performance 
only of all-equity  funds. Apart  from  these equity  funds, we do not have 
good enough data on the asset composition  of funds to make a proper 
comparison  of returns  to a passive portfolio strategy. Of course, even 
for equity funds one might argue that the S&P 500 may not be the 
proper  benchmark  portfolio. We compare  the returns  on equity funds 
directly  to the S&P 500 for two reasons. First, the distribution  of betas 
for the equity fund portfolios (measured  using the S&P 500  as the 
benchmark)  are tightly clustered  around  1.0. SEI reports  that, as of the 
end of  1990, the median beta for equity funds in the performance 
database  is 1.00, the 25th percentile  is 0.96, and the 75th percentile  is 
1.04.2 Second, the explicit market  objective of most of these funds is 
to beat the S&P 500. We are interested  in their ability to achieve that 
objective  quite apart  from any benchmark  dictated  by a particular  asset 
pricing model that market  participants  may or may not subscribe  to. 
Without  any doubt, beating the S&P 500 consistently will go a long 
way toward  attracting  additional  business for these money managers. 
We make one other important  decision in evaluating fund perfor- 
mance. Even though we are looking at equity funds that are almost 
fully invested, most of the funds  have some cash in their  holdings. This 
might be because of liquidity considerations  or tactical market  timing 
considerations.  During the 1980s the stock market  rose sharply, and 
2.  We also have computed  performance  numbers  analogous  to those in tables 1-5 
using  beta-adjusted  returns.  The results  changed  very little. 348  Brookings Papers: Microeconomics 1992 
Table 2.  Annual Return of Equity Funds and Percentage  Underperforming  S&P 
500, 1983-89a 
Percent 
Equally-weighted  Value-weighted  Funds 
return  return  S&P 500  underperforming 
Year  across  funds  across  funds  return  S&P 500 
1983  17.8  18.1  22.5  59 
1984  3.8  3.2  6.3  63 
1985  33.3  30.5  32.2  38 
1986  18.1  16.8  18.5  50 
1987  4.0  4.4  5.2  61 
1988  17.9  15.7  16.8  47 
1989  29.2  25.9  31.5  61 
Mean  across 
years  17.7  16.4  19.0  54 
a. Performance  database  excluding cash portfolio. 
holding cash virtually always reduced a fund's performance.  Fortu- 
nately, we also have information  on the return  on the equity portion  of 
the fund excluding cash. We compare  these latter  returns  to the return 
on the S&P 500 Index (with dividends included), thereby always ov- 
erstating  actual fund returns. This seems to be a theoretically  correct 
calculation since cash is riskless and returns  on cash should not be 
compared  with returns  on the S&P 500. 
Table 2 presents  the results on annual  performance  of pension fund 
managers  using the performance  database  for each of the years 1983 
to 1989 and for the whole sample. We present  the return  (before man- 
agement fees) for the equally-weighted  portfolio of funds, the value- 
weighted portfolio of funds, the return  on the S&P 500, and the per- 
centage of funds that  the S&P 500 Index beats. On average, the equity 
portion of a representative  fund has underperformed  the S&P 500 by 
1.3 percent  per year. In some years the equally-weighted  portfolio of 
funds  was several  percentage  points  behind  the  Index.  The  value-weighted 
portfolio of funds, which puts more weight on large funds, has under- 
performed  by even more-2.6  percent. In all but two years, the S&P 
500  performed  better than did the median fund, and overall it was in 
the 54th percentile. Remember  that these results are for the equity 
portion  of the funds; taking account  of cash would make the S&P 500 
look even better. Also recall that these returns  do not subtract  out fees 
for active management,  which averages  approximately  50 basis points Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny  349 
Table 3.  Annual Return of Equity Funds and Percentage  Underperforming  S&P 
500 by Investment  Style, 1983-89a 
Percent 
Year  Growth  Yield  Value  Other  All 
1983  17.7 (60)  19.5 (44)  17.0 (64)  17.3 (59)  17.8 (59) 
1984  1.8 (77)  8.4 (30)  4.5 (57)  5.6 (62)  3.8 (63) 
1985  33.1 (42)  33.5 (38)  33.6 (33)  34.7 (31)  33.3 (38) 
1986  16.2 (65)  21.2 (28)  19.7 (38)  18.5 (48)  18.1 (50) 
1987  5.3 (52)  1.1 (73)  2.9 (70)  4.4 (55)  4.0 (61) 
1988  16.6 (57)  21.3 (23)  18.2 (43)  17.9 (48)  17.9 (47) 
1989  29.2 (59)  27.0 (72)  30.2 (56)  28.9 (72)  29.2 (61) 
Mean  17.1 (59)  18.9 (44)  18.0 (52)  18.2 (54)  17.7 (54) 
a. Performance  database  excluding cash portfolio. Parentheses  indicate the percentage  underperforming  S&P 500. 
per year for these funds. These results suggest that, during  this period, 
active money management  subtracted  rather  than added value. 
It is difficult to come up with the right statistical test of inferior 
performance  by the funds over the 1983-89  period. A pooled time- 
series cross-section  test with 769 fund  observations  per  year  over seven 
years clearly rejects the null hypothesis  of returns  equal to those of the 
S&P 500,  but this test is not strictly correct because of the cross- 
correlation  between the returns  on the various funds, especially those 
with similar  investment  styles. At the opposite  extreme,  we can perform 
a test using only the annual  differences  between the equally-weighted 
average  return  across funds and the S&P 500. Such a test is based on 
seven annual differences and yields a t-statistic of  -  1.60, which is 
borderline  significant. 
Table 3 presents annual returns  for funds grouped by investment 
style along with the percentage  of funds that underperformed  the S&P 
500 each year by investment style. Overall, only those employing a 
yield-based  strategy  did  better  than  passive investing  during  this period, 
and this strategy  was used for only 11 percent  of all money managed. 
The growth funds performed  quite poorly; the median  fund following 
this strategy  outperformed  the Index in only one out of the seven years. 
Fund  managers  employing  value  and  other  strategies  did poorly  as well. 
3. This is not to say that most value-based  strategies  would have done poorly  over 
this  period.  In fact, it is quite  possible  that  those  calling  themselves  value managers  were 
not  faithful  to a value-based  strategy.  Alternatively,  they  may  have  just  followed  suboptimal 
value-based  strategies. 350  Brookings Papers: Microeconomics 1992 
Table 4.  Annualized  Return of Equity Funds and Percentage  Underperforming 
S&P  500, Three-Year  Intervals, 1983-89a 
Percent 
Equally-  Value-  Funds 
weighted  weighted  S&P 500  underperforming 
Interval  return  return  return  S&P 500 
1983-85  17.4  16.6  19.8  65 
1984-86  17.6  16.3  18.5  57 
1985-87  17.7  16.9  18.1  51 
1986-88  13.0  12.8  13.3  54 
1987-89  16.4  14.9  17.4  60 
Mean  16.4  15.3  17.4  57 
a. Performance  database  excluding cash portfolio. 
Table 5.  Annualized  Return of Equity Funds and Percentage  Underperforming 
S&P  500 by Investment  Style, Three-Year  Intervals, 1983-89a 
Percent 
Interval  Growth  Yield  Value  Other  All 
1983-85  16.5 (73)  19.8 (49)  17.5 (63)  18.5 (59)  17.4 (65) 
1984-86  16.1 (73)  20.5 (26)  18.5 (48)  18.9 (55)  17.6 (57) 
1985-87  17.5 (51)  17.8 (54)  18.0 (50)  18.5 (41)  17.7 (51) 
1986-88  12.4 (61)  14.0 (37)  13.2 (51)  13.3 (59)  13.0 (54) 
1987-89  16.4 (59)  15.8 (65)  16.4 (61)  16.6 (59)  16.4 (60) 
Mean  15.8 (63)  17.6 (46)  16.7 (55)  17.2 (54)  16.4 (57) 
a. Performance  database  excluding cash portfolio. Parentheses  indicate the percentage  underperforming  S&P 500. 
On average, the Index beat 59 percent  of growth  funds, 52 percent  of 
value funds, and 54 percent  of other  funds. This is further  evidence of 
value subtraction.  The inferior performance  of these funds is not the 
consequence  of a single misguided  strategy. Funds  pursuing  strategies 
as diverse as growth and value achieved bad results. 
Table 4 presents results on annualized  returns  parallel to those in 
table 2 for overlapping  three-year  holding periods. This is a typical 
length of time over which a money manager  must prove himself. Here 
the Index looks even better. It has outperformed  the median fund in 
each three-year  period, and in an average  three-year  period  during  this 
sample has beat the equally-weighted  portfolio of funds by 1 percent 
per  year. As table 5 shows, the Index  beat  the median  fund  over a three- 
year holding period in every portfolio strategy  except for yield. 
Table 6 produces some similar results for the search database. In 
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Table 6.  Performance  of Equity Funds, 1983-9Oa 
Percent 
Annualized  return  for 
three-year  period 
One-year  return  ending  in given  year 
Equally-  Percentile  Equally-  Funds 
weighted  S&P 500  rank  of  weighted  S&P 500  underperforming 
Year  return  return  S&P 500  return  return  S&P 500 
1983  25.9  22.5  37 
1984  4.7  6.3  57 
1985  34.7  32.2  27  20.9  19.8  41 
1986  18.6  18.5  48  18.6  18.5  52 
1987  4.5  5.2  58  18.5  18.1  52 
1988  18.4  16.8  46  13.4  13.3  51 
1989  29.9  31.5  57  17.0  17.4  56 
1990  -4.6  - 3.1  58  13.9  14.2  58 
Mean  16.5  16.2  49  17.1  16.9  51.7 
a. Search database;  equity return  excluding cash. 
years, but we are  fairly  confident  that  this is the consequence  of a highly 
selected sample. Recall that firms  are selected for the search  database 
partly  on superior  past performance.  When  they get included  they typ- 
ically come with five years of past performance  data. This makes the 
bias during  a period when the database  is rapidly  growing particularly 
severe. Accordingly, we use performance  numbers  only for the later 
years, when  the size of the database  is growing  more  slowly, to compare 
our findings with those of the performance  database. Still, there is 
probably some selection favoring good performers  even in the later 
years. This is borne out by the fact that the equally-weighted  returns 
for the search database  are higher than those for the performance  da- 
tabasefor  every year from 1983 to 1989, with  the differences  narrowing 
in the later years. Despite this potential  upward  bias, the firms in the 
search  database  do not perform  all that  well. Except  for the earlier  years 
1983 to 1985, when we have reason  to believe there  is still a substantial 
selection bias from the growth of the database, the numbers  for the 
search  database  are fairly close to those for the performance  database, 
even though  they are uniformly  higher. Factoring  in management  fees, 
the results from the search database  would lead one to conclude that 
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Historical Performance of Pension Funds and Comparison 
with Mutual Funds 
As we noted earlier, our results on the inferior  performance  of pen- 
sion fund equity managers  are in complete accord with the historical 
evidence. In 1981 Pensions and Investments  reported  that 74 percent 
of  the equity funds in the pension fund universe of  Becker (SEI's 
predecessor)  underperformed  the S&P 500 over the 1971-80  period. 
Gilbert  Beebower and Gary Bergstrom  report  results for the 1966-75 
period, although  they do not seem to limit themselves  to equity funds. 
They find that the average beta-adjusted  performance  of the pension 
funds lagged behind the S&P 500  by approximately  150 basis points 
per year.4 Gary Brinson, L. Randolph  Hood, and Beebower study the 
performance  of 91 large pension plans over the 1974-83  subperiod. 
They find that performance  of the funds lags behind the S&P 500  by 
110 basis points per year, with more substantial  underperformance  for 
the equity portion  of the portfolios.5 
These results are all the more interesting  when contrasted  with the 
investment  performance  of mutual funds. For example, the numbers 
reported  by Pensions and Investments  indicate that over the 1971-80 
period  (during  which  74 percent  of equity  pension  funds  underperformed 
the S&P 500) only 42 percent  of equity mutual  funds did so. The mean 
annual return  for the mutual funds over this period was 9.2  percent 
compared  with 6.9 percent  for the pension funds. 
A recent  study  by Richard  Ippolito  of mutual  fund  performance  finds 
that equity mutual  funds outperform  passive investment  strategies  by 
enough to cover all management  fees except load charges. (Loads are 
applicable only to some funds, and there is no positive correlation 
between load and portfolio performance.)  For the period 1964-85, 
Ippolito  finds annual  returns  of approximately  80 basis points above a 
beta-adjusted  S&P-based  benchmark  net of all fees but load.6 Edwin 
Elton, Martin  Gruber,  Sanjiv Das, and Mathew  Hlavka find some ab- 
normalities  in Ippolito's data. They assert that the true S&P-adjusted 
superior  performance  over the same time period  is only about  40 basis 
points. They also question the use of the S&P 500-based benchmark 
4.  Beebower  and Bergstrom  (1977). 
5.  Brinson,  Hood, and Beebower  (1986). 
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and claim that mutual funds do not exhibit superior  performance  in 
Ippolito's sample relative to a multifactor  benchmark  that includes a 
small-firm  index. In particular,  they argue  that the holdings of mutual 
funds are tilted toward smaller firms and that the superior  investment 
performance  of mutual  funds  found  by Ippolito  over the 1964-85 period 
is a result of this. Elton and his colleagues estimate  that mutual  funds 
underperform  the multifactor  benchmark  by approximately  150 basis 
points  per  year, although  for those invested  90 percent  or more  in stocks 
this number  is 107 basis points per year.7 
Importantly,  these numbers  for mutual  funds are all net of manage- 
ment fees that average 70 to 100 basis points per year. We must add 
these management  fees back in order  to look at pure portfolio perfor- 
mance of the mutual  funds and compare  this to the performance  of the 
pension funds. Hence, if we use Elton's numbers  we find mutual  fund 
portfolio performance  lags behind a passive benchmark  by anywhere 
from 7 to 80 (107 to 150 minus 70 to 100) basis points depending  on 
how much of the fund is invested in equities and what level of man- 
agement fees is assumed. 
These performance  numbers  for mutual  funds look on the order  of 
50 to 100 basis points better  than any of the numbers  we reported  for 
equity  pension  funds  regardless  of methodology  or sample  period.  Taken 
together,  this evidence leads us cautiously  to conclude  that  mutual  funds 
have outperformed  pension funds, at least from the mid-1960s through 
the mid-  1980s. There  are  two important  remaining  questions  about  this 
comparison. First, how would the historical comparison  look if the 
pension fund performance  were recalculated  relative to a multifactor 
benchmark  that included a small-firm  index? Although  pension funds 
probably  did not venture into small stocks nearly to the extent of the 
mutual  funds, they still held a portfolio  tilted toward  the smaller  stocks 
in the S&P 500. We base this guess on recent  data  we have on pension 
fund  holdings. If our  assumption  is correct,  then  a multifactor  correction 
will probably  reduce the estimate  of pension fund performance  for the 
mid-1960s through  the mid-1980s. Second, there  is the question  of the 
performance  of mutual  funds  over the most  recent  period, 1983 to 1989. 
We have been unable  to find any estimates  of mutual  fund  performance 
that focus on the equity portion of the fund only. This is a problem 
7.  Elton  and others  (forthcoming). 354  Brookings Papers: Microeconomics 1992 
because, in a rising  market,  holding  cash  reduces  performance.  Ignoring 
this problem, we report  the findings  of Lipper  Analytical  Services. Its 
numbers  indicate  poor performance  of mutual  funds over the 1983-89 
period.8  Importantly,  this has been one of the worst periods for small 
firms in a long time. Hence, using a multifactor  benchmark  and cor- 
recting for cash holdings, we see that  perhaps  mutual  funds did not do 
so badly over this period. On the other hand, this recent experience 
with mutual  funds makes us cautious about  leaning too heavily on the 
pension funds versus mutual  funds comparison.9 
Does  Active  Management  Pay  Off? 
The evidence on poor  performance  seems quite  compelling, but  there 
is another  way of looking at the service that  active money management 
provides. The purpose  of active management  is to trade  stocks  to ensure 
higher returns.  Accordingly, we can counterfactually  ask: what would 
happen  if money managers  froze their portfolios  at some point in time 
rather  than continuing to trade?  In particular,  what would be the dif- 
ference between the return  they would have earned  if they did not trade 
for the next 6 or 12 months, and the return  that they actually earned? 
As before, we do this calculation  for the part  of the portfolio  consisting 
of equity and  excluding  cash, and  for both equally-weighted  and  value- 
weighted  portfolios  of funds. Since only the performance  database  con- 
tains the actual portfolios and so enables us to compute returns  on 
"frozen" portfolios, we use that database  in this part  of the analysis. 
The results are presented  in table 7. The results on value-weighted 
portfolios show quite clearly that the trades made by the funds were 
counterproductive,  costing on average forty-two basis points relative 
to a portfolio frozen for six months and seventy-eight basis points 
relative to a portfolio frozen for twelve months. For value-weighted 
8. The numbers  on performance  of mutual  funds  were  kindly  provided  by Julie  Fried- 
lander  from  Lipper  Analytical  Services. 
9.  One explanation  for the poor performance  of the pension  funds and the mutual 
funds  relative  to the S&P  500 is that  the stocks  in the index  did well just by virtue  of being 
in the index. This could be the result of an increased  demand  for explicit and implicit 
indexation.  We cannot  directly  evaluate  this explanation,  but we do have some evidence 
against  it. We have  found  that,  even among  the  S&P  500 stocks,  pension  funds  have  chosen 
from among the poor performing  groups along certain  key dimensions,  including  past 
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Table 7.  Difference over Six and Twelve Months Between Actual Return on Equity 
Fund and Return on Hypothetical  Portfolio Frozen at Beginning  of Perioda 
Percent 
Difference  over 6 months  Difference  over 12 months 
Investment  Equally  Value  Equally  Value 
style  weighted  weighted  weighted  weighted 
All  0.004  -0.42  0.140  -0.78 
Growth  0.076  -0.24  0.620  -0.48 
Yield  -0.039  -0.26  -0.720  -0.80 
Value  0.030  -0.69  -0.002  -  1.42 
Other  -0.057  -0.46  0.240  -0.34 
a. Performance  database  excluding cash portfolio. 
portfolios, the performance  of every style has suffered as a result of 
trading. For equally-weighted  portfolios, the results are more ambig- 
uous. Over  the 6-month  horizon,  active  trading  never  makes  a difference 
of more  than 10 basis points. Over  the 12-month  horizon, active trading 
sometimes  helps and sometimes  hurts,  but it never makes  a substantial 
difference. Overall, a fair conclusion from this evidence seems to be 
that active trading, which is the principal  way in which funds are sup- 
posed to add  value to passive management,  does not really work. These 
results probably  suffer less from the benchmark  problem  discussed by 
Elton  and  his colleagues. The  benchmark  in this case is just the portfolio 
held by the fund at the beginning of the year, which should have a 
composition similar to the fund's portfolio over the year. 
Equity Performance and Turnover 
Another approach  to measuring  the benefits of active management 
is to use the data we have on equity turnover  as a proxy for the degree 
of active management.  Accordingly, we study  the relation  between the 
rate  of turnover  of an equity manager  and  the performance  he achieves. 
In table 8 three-year  and five-year annualized  equity returns  are re- 
gressed on equity turnover  measured  in percent  per year. The results, 
somewhat surprisingly, indicate a statistically and economically sig- 
nificant  positive relation between turnover  and performance.  For ex- 
ample, an increase in equity turnover  from its median  of 45 percent  to 
its 75th percentile value of 70 percent  per year is associated with ap- 
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Table 8.  Regressions  of Three-Year  and Five-Year  Annualized  Equity Performance 
on Equity Turnovera 
Percent 
Dependent  variable 
Independent  Three-year  return  Three-year  return Five-year  return Five-year  return 
variable  including  cash  excluding  cash  including  cash  excluding  cash 
Intercept  12.89  12.32  11.68  11.68 
(31.8)  (18.9)  (35.8)  (24.0) 
Equity  turnover 
(in percent  0.008  0.028  0.019  0.025 
per year)  (1.29)  (2.68)  (3.55)  (3.22) 
Number  of 
observations  203  97  203  97 
R  2  0.01  0.07  0.06  0.10 
a. Search database;  t-statistics  are in parentheses. 
the results in table 7, these estimates indicate that more active man- 
agement may be associated with higher returns  in the data. 
We are  somewhat  puzzled  by these  results.  Apparently,  high  turnover 
by itself is not a good proxy for excessive trading  or poor execution of 
an investment strategy. In fact, turnover  may be positively correlated 
with other attributes  of the fund's investment strategy that actually 
produced  superior  returns  over our sample period. We examined this 
possibility with respect to our four investment styles (value, yield, 
growth,  and  other), but  we find  that  this positive relation  between  return 
and  turnover  also seems to hold within  investment  styles. This indicates 
that  the relation  we observed  is not driven  by a spurious  relation  between 
style, turnover,  and performance.  On the other  hand, we would be the 
first to admit that the coarse style classifications in our data do not 
characterize  investment  strategies  very precisely. 
Consistency of a Manager's Performance over Time 
While our  results  suggest quite  clearly  that  the average  or the median 
fund  manager  does not add  value during  our sample  period, some funds 
in some years show superior  performance.  Is this superior  performance 
just a matter  of luck, or is there  some consistency  over time in achieving 
good results?  If we find that there is no consistency  over time, we can 
make the stronger  statement  that  not only do pension funds on average 
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If, on the other hand, we find some consistency, then some money 
managers  have actually delivered value even if most have not. At the 
very least, it may make sense for a sponsor  committed  to active man- 
agement  to put substantial  weight on past performance  when choosing 
a manager. In this section we address the issue of consistency. We 
primarily  use the performance  database,  although  we briefly  look at the 
search database  as well. As before, we look at the equity portion of 
the funds in the sample. 
To check for consistency over time, we divide funds into quartiles 
based  on performance  over some period  of time. Then  we check whether 
funds manage  to stay in their  performance  quartile  over the subsequent 
period, particularly  in the case of the best performance  quartile. Put 
differently, we are asking whether  the transition  matrix  between per- 
formance  quartiles  has diagonal  entries above 25 percent. In addition, 
we are interested  in knowing the performance  difference  in the follow- 
up period  between this period's best and worst performers.  We look at 
the annual,  biannual,  and  triennial  performance  windows. We also look 
at transition  matrices  within investment  styles since the relevant  mea- 
sure of consistency might be within a style rather  than  for all the funds 
combined. 
Table 9 presents the annual results for the performance  database. 
For the pension funds as a whole, there does not appear  to be much 
consistency of performance  over time. The diagonal  entries  of the tran- 
sition matrix  are close to 25 percent;  thus, the probability  that a fund 
from  the best performing  quartile  ends up in the best  performing  quartile 
the next year is 26 percent  and in the worst performing  quartile  is 27 
percent. A fund from the worst performing  quartile  has a 32 percent 
probability  of ending up in the best performing  quartile  the next year, 
and only a 24 percent probability  of staying in the worst performing 
quartile.  Perhaps  an even more telling way to look at the lack of con- 
sistency  is by comparing  postranking  performance.  The  best performing 
funds average 25.5 percent  in an average  year during  this period  com- 
pared  with only 5.5 percent  for the worst performing  funds. Yet in the 
year after they are ranked, the best performers  averaged 17.6 percent 
compared  with 18.5 percent  for the worst performers.  Thus, a pension 
plan  picking a winning fund could have expected a deterioration  of its 
performance  of almost 8 percent, and a pension plan picking a losing 
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Table 9.  Equity Fund Performance  over Time Using Quartile Rankings  of One- 
Year Past Performance  to Predict Future One-Year  Performancea 
Return over 
Investment  Return over past  future one-year 
style  lb  2b  3b  4b  one-year period"  period' 
All 
(Top)  1  26  24  23  27  25.5  17.6 
2  20  26  29  25  18.4  17.3 
3  22  j  28  26  24  13.7  17.4 
(Bottom)  4  32  22  22  24  5.5  18.5 
Growth 
1  26  22  24  27  25.5  16.6 
2  17  29  31  23  17.3  16.3 
3  23  29  25  23  12.6  17.3 
4  34  21  22  24  4.6  18.0 
1  21  30  24  24  25.3  18.6 
2  22  24  32  22  20.1  19.0 
3  21  24  29  26  16.0  18.0 
4  33  25  16  26  8.4  19.4 
Value 
1  27  26  21  25  24.7  18.7 
2  24  26  29  21  18.5  18.6 
3  22  25  28  25  14.3  17.6 
4  27  22  22  29  6.3  17.7 
a. Performance  database  excluding cash portfolio. Too few observations  prevented  us from doing these calculations for the 
style "Other.' 
b. Data in these columns show transition  probabilities  for movement fronm  a given past one-year performance  quartile into 
future  performance  quartiles. 
c. Equally-weighted  annual  returns  for all funds ranking  in a given quartile  based on one-year past performance. 
fact, at the annual  frequency,  picking a loser gives a higher  subsequent 
return  than  picking a winner. This is a remarkable  lack of performance 
persistence. 
The results for the growth and yield styles are roughly similar to 
those we reported  earlier, although there is some persistence for the 
value style. For growth  and yield, the diagonal  entries  of the transition 
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have higher subsequent returns than do the best performers. For value, 
in contrast,  the diagonal  entries  are above  25  percent,  and best  per- 
formers earn an extra 1 percent postranking over the worst performers. 
A lack of consistency  might be from a genuine absence of stock-picking 
skills.  Alternatively,  it might be a consequence  of too short an evalu- 
ation  horizon.  If  annual returns are determined  largely  by  luck,  but 
longer  term returns are determined  in part by  skill,  then the lack  of 
consistency  in annual data might not be  strong evidence  against the 
existence  of differences  in skills  between  managers. 
Table  10 presents biannual results.  To our surprise, there is quite a 
bit of performance consistency,  although quantitatively the effect is not 
huge.  Funds as a whole  are clearly more likely  than random to remain 
in their performance quartile; funds that are the best have a 28 percent 
chance  of  remaining the best,  and funds that are the worst have  a 30 
percent chance of remaining the worst. The best performers still show 
a subsequent deterioration of performance of about 4.8 percent per year 
and the worst performers show an improvement of performance of 8.4 
percent. Counting on performance results to continue as before is clearly 
a mistake. On the other hand, the best performers on average outperform 
the worst  performers by  1.2  percent per year during the postranking 
period,  which  is not trivial in this business.  While the effects  are not 
huge,  these  data suggest  that it is better to bet on the past winners. 
Interestingly,  these  results  obtain for just  about every  investment 
style. For growth the expected benefit from investing in a winner relative 
to investing  in a loser is 0.8  percent per year.  For yield  the benefit is 
1 percent, and for value the benefit rises to 1  .8 percent. At the biannual 
frequency,  then,  there is evidence  of performance consistency. 
Results  on the triennial frequency are by far the strongest,  both for 
pension funds as a whole  and for individual styles  (table 1  1). There is 
very  clear  consistency.  Diagonal  entries  of  the transition matrix are 
typically  above  30 percent.  In expectation,  the gain from investing  in 
winners relative to losers is 2. 1 percent per year for funds as a whole. 
A test for the difference of future returns between past returns quartiles 
1 and 4 has a t-statistic  of  7.4;  the test for differences  between  past 
performance quartiles (1,2)  versus (3,4)  has a t-statistic of 6. 1. These 
test statistics  are no doubt a bit high because  the assumption of  inde- 
pendence across funds is violated. 
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Table 10. Equity Fund Performance  over Time Using Quartile Rankings of Past 
Two-Year Performance  to Predict Future Two-Year  Performancea 
Returtn  over 
Investment  Return over past  future two-year 
style  lb  2'b  3 b  4b  two-year period"  period" 
All 
(Top)  1  28  27  24  20  22.9  18.1 
2  21  28  26  25  17.8  17.5 
3  22  27  26  25  14.6  17.4 
(Bottom)  4  28  19  23  30  8.5  16.9 
Growth 
1  24  28  25  23  22.4  17.2 
2  21  29  29  24  16.7  17.0 
3  26  23  26  24  13.4  17.2 
4  29  21  21  29  7.4  16.4 
Yield 
1  29  28  23  20  23.6  18.5 
2  23  32  26  19  19.8  18.4 
3  24  20  28  28  16.6  18.1 
4  22  22  24  31  11.6  17.5 
V alue_  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ 
1  30  28  20  23  22.9  18.5 
2  22  28  27  23  18.4  18.0 
3  22  27  27  24  15.3  18.2 
4  26  17  27  30  9.1  16.7 
a. Performance  database  excluding cash portfolio. Too few observations  prevenited  us from doing these calculations for the 
style  "Other." 
b. Data in these columns show transitioni  probabilities  for movement from a given past two-year performance  quartile into 
various two-year performance  quartiles. 
c. Equally-weighted  annual returns  for all funds ranking  in a given quartile  based on past two-year perforimiance. 
investment  style.  The results  indicate  some  performance consistency 
within  every  style.  The expected  gain from investing  in past winners 
relative to past losers is 2.3  percent for growth funds,  0.9  percent for 
yield  funds,  and 1.6 percent for value funds. Growth funds thus seem 
to show long-run consistency  but no short-run consistency  even though 
we  often  associate  these  funds with  short investment  horizons.  Yield 
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Table 11. Equity Fund Performance  over Time Using Quartile  Rankings  of Past 
Three-Year  Performance  to Predict Future Three-Year  Performancea 
Return  over  past  Return  over 
Investment  three-year  future three-year 
style  1b  2  b  3  b  4  b  period"  period" 
All 
(Top)  1  37  29  20  13  24.3  15.9 
2  20  26  29  25  19.3  14.6 
3  19  24  30  26  16.1  14.5 
(Bottom)  4  23  21  20  35  10.3  13.8 
Growth 
1  37  28  21  14  23.1  15.6 
2  20  27  29  24  17.8  14.5 
3  19  27  29  24  15.0  14.1 
4  25  19  21  35  9.0  13.3 
Yield 
1  30  23  23  23  25.6  15.2 
2  31  33  28  9  22.3  15.8 
3  17  24  29  29  18.8  14.4 
4  20  21  21  38  13.9  14.3 
Value 
1  33  25  25  16  24.2  15.6 
2  28  25  22  24  20.1  15.0 
3  16  25  32  26  16.9  14.6 
4  22  24  20  34  11.0  14.0 
a. Performance  database  excluding cash portfolio. Too few observations  prevented  us from doing these calculations for the 
style "Other." 
b. Data in these columns show transition  probabilities  for movement from a given past three-year  perforniance  quartile  into 
various  three-year  performance  quartiles. 
c. Equally-weighted  annual  returns  for all funds ranking  in a given quartile  based on past three-year  performance. 
consistency as horizons increase  even though  they are associated  with 
long-term  investment. We have no clear explanation  for this result. 
We also used the search database  to look at consistency of perfor- 
mance. The data are organized  by money management  firm  rather  than 
by sponsor. Once again, we use the data  only from later  years because 
of the selection bias that  may affect the time consistency  results  as well 
as the cross-sectional  comparisons.  On  the whole, the results  are  similar 362  Brookings Papers: Microeconomics 1992 
to those  for the performance database,  except  that there is somewhat 
less  consistency.  Consistency  does  not show up at all strongly except 
for the three-year horizon. Over that horizon, the expected benefit from 
going  with past winners  rather than past losers  is approximately  110 
basis points per year over the next three years. 
Taken together,  our results support the notion that some  managers 
are more skillful  than others in achieving  superior investment perfor- 
mance. They also suggest that allocating money among money managers 
in response  to  past performance  might be  a worthwhile  task for the 
sponsors.  The results also weakly  suggest  that longer horizon perfor- 
mance evaluations  might be preferred. 
We must present these results with two caveats.  First, because there 
is a bias toward survival of the better funds, we may be overestimating 
the degree of consistency  of performance over time.  10 Second,  because 
we  have results only  for a relatively  short period of  time,  we  cannot 
be certain that the best performing funds in the first subperiod were not 
just  lucky  in the second  subperiod due to the fortuitous  success  of  a 
correlated  set  of  investment  strategies  that they  each  employed.  Al- 
though we made sure that consistency  of performance over the sample 
period  was  not just  the consequence  of  the performance of  our four 
investment styles over this period, it could be the consequence of certain 
other strategies over both subperiods. 
Our results  do not imply  that the best  money  mangers selected  in 
this way  can be expected  to beat a passive  investment  strategy since 
the expected  returns net of management fees even for these good man- 
agers appear to be below  the S&P 500  returns. Our evidence  suggests 
that by  using  three  years  of  past  performance  data and choosing  a 
manager in the top quartile, one can expect to beat the average manager 
by  approximately  100  basis  points.  But  recall  that over  our  sample 
period the average manager underperforms the S&P 500  by  130 basis 
points,  and this does  not even  include  50  basis  points  of  extra man- 
agement  fees. "  Of course,  we  make no claim  that we  have  searched 
10. Brown  and  others  (1991). 
11. An alternative  approach  here  would  be to compare  the second  subperiod  returns  of 
the first  subperiod  top performers  directly  to the S&P 500 returns.  If we do that  we find 
that  the top performers  average  15.9 percent;  the S&P  500 return  is 15.4 percent.  But this 
does not include  approximately  50 basis points in extra  management  fees, which when 
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for the optimal rule for using past data to pick managers. Perhaps the 
optimal filter rule can select  a manager whose  performance net of fees 
is superior to that of a passive  indexing  strategy-a  subject for a more 
thorough future study.  In the next section  we ask how this industry is 
organized  in response  to the elusiveness  of  superior performance. 
Elusive Quality and the Organization  of the Industry 
In the money  management industry, ascertaining the future perfor- 
mance of  the manager is very difficult.  In response to this difficulty, 
the  industry has  split  into two  segments.  The first segment  does  not 
face the problem of unobservable quality. Firms in this segment,  which 
tend to be large banks and insurance companies,  provide fairly generic 
products,  such  as  index  funds,  immunized  and dedicated-bond  port- 
folios,  guaranteed investment contracts,  annuities,  and other products 
that require fewer investment skills but require a reputation for stability 
acquired over many years in the market. This segment of the industry 
does not engage in as much constant communication with the sponsors, 
and its cost  structure probably shows  rapidly declining  average costs. 
As a result this segment of the industry is very stable and concentrated. 
A few reputable providers capture and keep a large share of the market. 
The second segment of the industry provides specialized  rather than 
generic money  management,  such as portfolio  selection.  Firms in this 
segment are typically  much smaller,  characterized by highly differen- 
tiated products (at least in terms of presentation). Styles and approaches 
within styles  differ.  To succeed  in this segment of the industry, a firm 
seems  to  need  a concept  and a story  as much as  it needs  good  past 
performance.  Firms in this segment also provide a lot more service  to 
the treasurer's office  in terms of  direct interaction and hand holding. 
We will  argue that this is a direct result of agency problems within the 
sponsors' organizations.  Because  one of the inputs into the production 
is that  it gives a biased  view of the performance  of the better  pension  funds  since pension 
funds  do uniformly  better  in the second  subperiod  (1986-88 or 1987-89) than  in the first 
subperiod  (1983-85 or 1984-86). Hence, all pension  funds, not just the best ones, look 
better  when  focusing  on the second  subperiod  returns.  We believe  that  the proper  approach 
is to estimate  the gain to picking a top performer  separately  and then to combine  this 
information  with performance  data  on the average  fund  for the entire  sample  period. 364  Brookings Papers: Microeconomics 1992 
Table 12. Top 15 Money Managers, End-1990 
Tax-exempt  Percentage  of  Percentage  of 
assets managed  tax-exempt  assets in generic 
Rank  Name  (billions)  market  products 
1  Bankers  Trust  85.1  3.9  52.4 
2  Wells Fargo  73.9  3.4  70.2 
3  Metropolitan  Life  51.6  2.4  59.1 
4  Prudential  Asset  48.8  2.3  67.0 
5  Aetna  Life  45.2  2.1  49.6 
6  State  Street  Bank  45.0  2.1  60.0 
7  J. P. Morgan  42.8  2.0  15.9 
8  Mellon  Capital  29.2  1.4  99.7 
9  Fidelity  29.0  1.3  4.8 
10  CIGNA  Investments  28.4  1.3  29.6 
11  Pacific  Investment  28.1  1.3  3.9 
12  Northern  Trust  27.4  1.3  5.1 
13  Alliance  Capital  27.1  1.3  23.2 
14  GE Investments  27.1  1.3  23.6 
15  Equitable  Capital  24.1  1.1  ... 
Source: Pensionis  anid  Inivestmnents,  various issues. 
process of this segment is extensive  interaction between key employees 
of the money management firm and employees  of the treasurer's office, 
the increasing  returns to size  are much weaker.  In this industry there 
also is no clear consensus about who the best managers are. Performance 
varies widely  from year to year,  and different  methods  may work at 
different times. 
As a result of these factors,  firms in this segment are much smaller 
than the providers of  generic  products,  and the segment  is extremely 
unconcentrated. As we will  show,  sponsors clearly reallocate funds in 
response to past performance,  and because  consistent  performance is 
fairly elusive,  there is tremendous turnover at the top in terms of industry 
leadership and market share.  In short,  the industry looks  very  much 
like an unconcentrated, highly segmented,  service-oriented industry for 
which perceptions of the qualities of individual firms vary widely  over 
time and across customers.  The structure of this industry is not unlike 
that of  hair salons  or trendy restaurants. The contrast to the generic, 
stable segment of the industry is striking. 
Tables  12 through  16 illustrate some  of  these  assertions.  Table  12 
lists the 15 largest tax-exempt money managers. It also shows the total 
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market, and the fraction of its money under management committed to 
" generic"  products-in  particular, index funds,  GICs (which lock in 
a fixed return  for defined-contribution plans), immunized and dedicated- 
bond portfolios  (the approximate analog of  GICs except  for defined- 
benefit plans),  and annuities.  The table shows  clearly  that the largest 
money managers tend to be insurance companies  and banks and that a 
large fraction  of  their assets  is  in generic  products.  But there is one 
caveat: insurance companies and banks sometimes buy investment coun- 
selors and thereby gain entry into the active management market. The 
concentration  ratio in the overall  tax-exempt  management industry is 
not large: the largest  10 firms together have a 22 percent market share. 
Excluding  index fund products, GICs,  and immunized and dedicated- 
bond portfolios,  the market share of the top  10 falls  to  13.8  percent. 
The share of the top 10 would be even lower after excluding  annuities, 
but we could not make this calculation  without aggregate numbers on 
pension  annuities.  In sum,  the largest money  managers are primarily 
involved  in the production of fairly generic,  undifferentiated products 
for  which  performance  evaluation  is  relatively  easy  and where  sub- 
stantial economies  of  scale  exist. 
Table 13 provides additional detail on the 10 largest banks, 10 largest 
insurance companies,  and 10 largest investment counselors.  Banks and 
insurance companies  are larger than investment counselors  and have a 
higher commitment to generic products. The concentration ratio is much 
higher  within  the bank  and  insurance  company  subsegments  of  the 
market than it  is  within  the  investment  counselor  subsegment.  The 
concentration  ratios are 46.0,  51.7,  and 22.9  percent for the top  10 
firms in each subsegment,  respectively.  These numbers are consistent 
with our earlier observation that, within the generic products category, 
there are more increasing returns and hence more room for concentra- 
tion.  For example,  the top four money  managers offering  equity  in- 
dexing of discretionary tax-exempt  assets manage 73 percent of all the 
equity-indexed  assets  managed by the top 25 firms.'2 
Table  14 addresses the issue  of mobility  by showing  the largest  10 
banks, the largest 10 insurance companies,  and the largest 25 investment 
counselors at four different years during the 1980-90  period. The table 
reveals tremendous stability in the relative rankings among banks and 
12.  Pensions and Investments, May 20,  1991,  p. 36. 366  Brookings Papers: Microeconomics 1992 
Table 13. Top 10 Managers  by Type of Firm, End-1990 
Tax-exempt  Percentage  of  Percentage  of 
assets managed  subsegment  assets in 
Rank  Name  (billions)  of the market  generic  products 
Insurance  companies 
1  Metropolitan  Life  51.6  8.1  59.1 
2  Prudential  48.8  7.6  67.0 
3  Aetna  45.2  7.1  49.6 
4  CIGNA  28.4  4.4  29.6 
5  Equitable  Capital  24.1  3.8  ... 
6  Principal  Financial  21.5  3.4  25.6 
7  Travelers  21.4  3.4  93.5 
8  John  Hancock  19.4  3.0  62.4 
9  Equitable  Real Estate  18.6  2.9  ... 
10  Massachusetts  Mutual  14.5  2.3  46.9 
Banks  or trust  companies 
1  Bankers  Trust  85.1  11.7  52.4 
2  Wells Fargo  Nikko  73.9  10.1  70.2 
3  State  Street  Bank  45.0  6.2  60.0 
4  J. P. Morgan  42.8  5.9  15.9 
5  Mellon  Capital  29.2  4.0  99.7 
6  Northern  Trust  27.4  3.8  5.1 
7  Mellon  Bond  20.0  2.7  44.5 
8  Capital  Guardian  19.6  2.7  ... 
9  Chase  Investors  19.0  2.6  16.8 
10  Trust  Co. of the West  14.7  2.0  1.4 
Independent  investment  counselors 
1  FMR-Fidelity  29.0  3.7  4.8 
2  GE Investments  27.1  3.4  23.6 
3  Miller, Anderson  19.7  2.5  ... 
4  Boston  Co.  18.1  2.3  ... 
5  Lincoln  Capital  16.5  2.1  44.8 
6  Delaware  Investment  14.8  1.9  ... 
7  Fayez Sarofim  14.1  1.8  ... 
8  Wellington  14.0  1.8  ... 
9  INVESCO  13.4  1.7  ... 
10  Fischer-Francis  13.4  1.7  0.8 
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insurance companies,  and a great deal of  instability of market shares 
among investment counselors.  Again,  this evidence  is consistent  with 
our interpretation of  the nongeneric  end of  money  management  as a 
highly  specialized  service  business  that does  not have  a well-defined 
quality aspect and hence  lacks a stable configuration of market shares 
for its differentiated  products. 
Past Performance and Changes in Money Under Management 
This broad characterization of nongeneric money management raises 
a key question.  What determines the movement of money under man- 
agement between firms? In this section we show that net accounts gained 
is quite sensitive  to past performance.  To this end,  we  use the infor- 
mation in the search database on net number of new accounts  gained 
(in percent)  and net dollar value  of  new  accounts gained (in percent) 
as a function  of three previous  years'  equity returns. 
Table 15 presents the results. The first two columns of table 15 show 
pooled time-series  cross-section  results; the dependent variable in each 
column  is based on data for accounts gained and lost for each money 
management  firm in each of  the years  1987 through 1990.  The inde- 
pendent variable  is  the difference  between  the money  manager's  an- 
nualized  return over the previous  three years and the return achieved 
by the average manager in our sample over that period. The first column 
shows that for each 100 basis points per year that a manager outperforms 
the universe  of  managers over the previous  three-year period,  he ex- 
periences  a  1.3  percent  increase  in the number of  new  accounts  the 
following  year.  But this  1.3 percent increase does  not capture the full 
effect  of the three years of good performance on new accounts gained 
because  it ignores  the accounts  gained  after more than one year.  We 
assume that performance goes  back to normal, and in each subsequent 
year new accounts gained are the same linear function of the equally- 
weighted  return averaged across the previous three years. 
The full estimated effect  of three years of good past performance in 
terms of accounts gained over the next three years would then be 2.6 
percent more accounts for every  100 basis points per year of superior 
performance.  A  typical  number for the difference  between  90th  per- 
centile and median three-year annualized performance  is 450 basis points, 
which would  translate into  11.7  percent more accounts over the next Table 
14. 
Tax-Exempt 
Market 
Leadership 
over 
Time 
by 
Type 
of 
Firm, 
1980, 
1984, 
1987, 
1990 
Ranka 
1980 
1984 
1987 
1990 
Insurance 
companies 
1 
Prudential 
Equitable 
Prudential 
Prudential 
2 
Equitable 
Metropolitan 
Life 
Equitable 
Metropolitan 
Life 
3 
Aetna 
Prudential 
Metropolitan 
Aetna 
4 
Metropolitan 
Life 
Aetna 
Aetna 
Equitable 
5 
CIGNAb 
Travelers 
New 
England 
Mutual 
New 
England 
Mutual 
6 
Travelers 
CIGNA 
Travelers 
CIGNA 
7 
John 
Hancock 
New 
England 
Mutual 
CIGNA 
Pacific 
Mutual 
8 
Bankers 
Life 
John 
Hancock 
Pacific 
Mutual 
John 
Hancock 
9 
Pacific 
Mutual 
New 
York 
Life 
John 
Hancock 
Travelers 
10 
New 
England 
Mutual 
Pacific 
Mutual 
New 
York 
Life 
Principal 
Financial 
Banks 
or 
trust 
companies 
1 
J. 
P. 
Morgan 
Bankers 
Trust 
Bankers 
Trust 
Bankers 
Trust 
2 
Bankers 
Trust 
J. 
P. 
Morgan 
J. 
P. 
Morgan 
Wells 
Fargo 
3 
Harris 
Trust 
Citicorp 
Wells 
Fargo 
Mellon 
Bank 
4 
Citicorp 
Manufacturers 
Hanover 
Mellon 
Bank 
State 
Street 
Bank 
5 
Mellon 
Bank 
Wells 
Fargo 
State 
Street 
Bank 
J. 
P. 
Morgan 
6 
Manufacturers 
Hanover 
Mellon 
Bank 
Citicorp 
Northern 
Trust 
7 
Crocker 
Chase 
Investors 
Capital 
Guardian 
Capital 
Guardian 
8 
Capital 
Guardian 
Capital 
Guardian 
Chase 
Investors 
Chase 
Investors 
9 
Wells 
Fargo 
State 
Street 
Bank 
Northern 
Trust 
Trust 
Co./West 
10 
Chemical 
Bank 
Northern 
Trust 
Fiduciary 
Trust 
Boatmen's 
Trust Independent 
investment 
counselors 
1 
Alliance 
Batterymarch 
GE 
Investments 
Fidelity 
2 
Scudder 
Stevens 
Jennison 
Mitchell 
Hutchins 
GE 
Investments 
3 
Fayez 
Sarofim 
Criterion 
Boston 
Co. 
Miller 
Anderson 
4 
Lionel 
Edie 
Fayez 
Sarofim 
Miller 
Anderson 
Boston 
Co. 
5 
T. 
Rowe 
Price 
Fischer-Francis 
Lehman 
Management 
Lincoln 
Capital 
6 
State 
Street 
Research 
T. 
Rowe 
Price 
Oppenheimer 
Morgan 
Stanley 
7 
Putnam 
Scudder 
Delaware 
Investment 
Delaware 
Investment 
8 
Batterymarch 
Lehman 
Management 
INVESCO 
Fayez 
Sarofim 
9 
Brown 
Brothers 
Harriman 
Delaware 
Investment 
Scudder 
Stevens 
Wellington 
10 
Loomis 
Sayles 
Wellington 
Mgmt/Thorndike 
RCM 
Capital 
INVESCO 
11 
Duff 
& 
Phelps 
Brown 
Brothers 
Harriman 
Fischer-Francis 
Fischer-Francis 
12 
Stein 
Roe 
Boston 
Co. 
Fayez 
Sarofim 
Brinson 
13 
Boston 
Co. 
Oppenheimer 
T. 
Rowe 
Price 
Merrill 
14 
Jennison 
Miller 
Anderson 
Sanford 
Bernstein 
Lehman 
Management 
15 
Thorndike 
Rosenberg 
Wellington/TDP&L 
Lazard 
Freres 
16 
Delaware 
Stein 
Roe 
Criterion 
Capital 
Research 
17 
IDS 
Lincoln 
Capital 
Morgan 
Stanley 
Oppenheimer 
18 
Western 
Asset 
Forstman 
Leff 
Lazard 
Freres 
Sanford 
Bernstein 
19 
David 
Babson 
BEA 
Lincoln 
Capital 
Scudder 
Stevens 
20 
Oppenheimer 
INVESCO 
BEA 
Duff 
& 
Phelps 
21 
Rosenberg 
Capital 
Supervisors 
Batterymarch 
T. 
Rowe 
Price 
22 
MacKay-Shields 
Sanford 
Bernstein 
Neuberger 
& 
Berman 
JMB 
Realty 
23 
Bernstein-Macaulay 
Neuberger 
& 
Berman 
Brown 
Brothers 
Harriman 
Mitchell 
Hutchins 
24 
Fischer-Francis 
Lazard 
Freres 
Fidelity 
Franklin 
Advisers 
25 
Forstman 
Leff 
IDS 
Capital 
Supervisors 
PRIMCO 
Source: 
Pensions 
and 
Investments, 
various 
issues. 
a. 
The 
rankings 
are 
based 
on 
a 
slightly 
different 
treatment 
of 
subsidiaries 
so 
they 
do 
not 
exactly 
coincide 
with 
the 
rankings 
in 
tables 
12 
and 
13. 
b. 
Connecticut 
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Table 15. Regressions  of Net Accounts Gained on Past Performance  for Single and 
Multiple Equity Product Firmsa 
Percent 
Net percentage  gained 
In value of  In value of 
In number of  accounts  In number of  accounts 
accounts  (multiple  accounts  (single 
Independent  (multiple  product  (single product  product 
variable  product firms)  firms)  firms)  firms) 
Intercept  8.51  3.38  8.09  3.24 
(9.97)  (6.71)  (7.97)  (3.89) 
Three-year  annualized 
equity  return  minus 
universe  mean  in  1.28  0.99  1.85  1.36 
percent  (5.80)  (7.57)  (7.38)  (6.60) 
Number  of 
observations  935  935  505  505 
R  2  0.03  0.06  0.10  0.08 
a. Search database. 
three years. The second column shows the dollar value of net new 
accounts gained as a function  of past performance.  The point estimate 
of 0.99 indicates  that  over three  years, the value of new accounts  gained 
after three years of outperforming  the universe by  100 basis points 
would be approximately  2 percent  of existing accounts. The coefficient 
is smaller than the coefficient in the first column since new accounts 
received are typically of smaller than average size in dollar value. 
These numbers are likely to underestimate  the importance  of past 
equity performance  for new equity accounts gained. For the search 
database  used here, we have accounts  gained and accounts  lost only at 
the level of the entire money management  firm  and not for a particular 
equity product  offered by the firm and followed by SEI. We are then 
predicting  the changes in accounts for all fixed income, balanced and 
equity products  offered by the firm  using the performance  data  on only 
the particular  equity products  of the firm that are followed by SEI. In 
the future  we will try to compile more specific information  on accounts 
gained and lost from lists provided  by SEI. For now we can partially 
deal with this measurement  problem  by restricting  ourselves to money 
management  firms  that offer fewer products.  The third  and fourth  col- 
umns of table 15 show the results  of restricting  the sample  to firms  that Josef Lakonishok,  Andrei  Shleifer,  and Robert  W. Vishny  371 
offer only a single equity product.  As expected, the point estimates  on 
the three-year  performance  variable  rise significantly-from  1.28 and 
0.99 to 1.85 and 1.36, an increase  of approximately  40 percent  in the 
sensitivity of net new accounts with respect to past performance. 
The extreme instability  of top rankings  in the investment  counselor 
category appears to be the result of sponsor responsiveness to past 
performance.  Partly, this responsiveness  might reflect the rational  re- 
sponse to the consistency of performance  over time. But the sensitivity 
of money inflows to past performance  also might in part reflect the 
agency problems  within the sponsor's organization.  For example, the 
treasurer's  office may fire a poorly performing  manager  as part of a 
scapegoat strategy, or it may hire a stellar past performer  in order to 
avoid being second-guessed  ex post. 
Past Performance and the Dispersion of Management Fees 
In a market  supposedly  characterized  by an important  quality com- 
ponent, it is natural  to ask whether  there  is enough  agreement  on quality 
that some firms  can charge  higher  fees in exchange  for their  ostensibly 
higher quality products. The most basic question is whether there is 
much variation  in fees at all, irrespective  of the relation  between fees 
and perceived quality. In fact, there seems to be fairly little variation 
in fees charged  in this industry.  Once you restrict  yourself to a certain 
size of account  for a particular  broad  category  of product  and  a particular 
type of money manager  organization,  you find fairly small differences 
in fees charged. For example, for large investment  counselors  actively 
managing  equities, the median  fees charged  for a $50 million account 
in 1985 were 53 basis points per year, with the 25th percentile at 43 
basis points and the 75th percentile  fee at 56 basis points. The corre- 
sponding  numbers  for a $25 million account were 60 basis points, 52 
basis points, and 70 basis points. 
While there  does not seem to be a large amount  of variation  in fees, 
we can still ask: how much of the variation in fees is explained by 
perceived  quality  as proxied  for  by past  performance?  Table 16 contains 
the results of regressions  of equity management  fees for a $25 million 
account  in 1990 on five-year annualized  historical  equity performance 
(in percent)  with and without  controlling  for the amount  of tax-exempt 
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Table 16. Regression  of Equity Management  Fees for a $25 Million Account on 
Five-Year  Past Equity Performance  and Log of Amount  of Tax-Exempt  Money 
Under Management, 1990a 
Percent 
Independent  variable  lf  IIC 
Intercept  0.396  0.660 
(4.44)  (4.80) 
Five-year  annualized  equity  return  minus  0.019  0.016 
universe  mean  (2.79)  (2.27) 
Log of amount  of tax-exempt  money  under  -0.0296 
management  (2.35) 
Number  of observations  156  154 
R  2  0.05  0.07 
a. Search database. 
b. Controlling  for the amount  of tax-exempt  money under  mananagement. 
c. Not controlling for the amount  of tax-exempt  money under  management. 
scale).  The  results  show  that  an  extra  300  basis  points  per  year  over 
the  previous  five  years  translates  into  only  an extra  5 to  6 basis  points 
in  management  fees.  The  R-squared  indicates  that  past  performance 
alone  explains  only  5  percent  of  the  variation  in  fees. 
These  results  are consistent  with  the notion  that managers  have  little 
ability  to charge  for higher  quality  based  on good  past  performance  and 
that no consensus  exists  about  who  the better  managers  are.  Since  better 
past  performers  do  not  charge  much  more,  the  strategy  of  switching  to 
the  good  past  performers  may  not  be  a bad  one.  This  last  suggestion, 
however,  awaits  a  more  thorough  study  of  the  consistency  of  perfor- 
mance  over  time,  which  we  hope  to  do  in  the  future. 
Industry  Structure  and  Agency  Problems 
Some  of  the  features  we  have  described  of  the  money  management 
industry  are  a  direct  consequence  of  the  agency  problems  within  the 
sponsor  organizations  and  those  between  the  sponsor  and  the  money 
manager.  In this  section  we  take  the viewpoint  first of  the  sponsors  and 
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Table 17. Changes in Pension Fund Composition  over Time, 1980-90 
Year  Percentage  of assets 
Top 200 indexed  plans 
1980  2.5 
1984  5.0 
1985  10.5 
1986  12.1 
1987  15.5 
1988  12.9 
1989  16.9 
1990  14.4 
Top 200 contribution-defined  plans 
1985  9.3 
1986  9.1 
1987  8.7 
1988  19.1 
1989  18.5 
1990  19.3 
Source: Pensions and Investmenits,  various issues. 
Sponsors' Response 
Undoubtedly,  the underperformance  by active money managers  has 
led sponsors  to shift toward  generic products  in general  and indexation 
in particular. 
THE  MOVE  TO  INDEXATION.  Table 17 shows the percentage  of assets 
of the top 200 pension plans that are indexed. The allocation  of money 
to index funds increased  sharply  from 1984 to 1987, with the biggest 
jump in 1985, allegedly because of extremely poor performance  by 
active money managers  in 1983 and 1984. But between 1987 and 1990 
there  was no clear trend  toward  increased  indexation  of pension assets. 
Given  the inferior  historical  performance  of active  pension-fund  man- 
agers and the extra fees they charge for active management,  indexing 
looks like a very good strategy  from  the point  of view of the  beneficiaries 
and the corporation.  Indexing also reduces the number  of times the 
corporate  treasurer's  office must explain why the money managers  it 
uses perform  so poorly. This is because  the index may actually  perform 
better  on average  than a typical money manager  and because indexing 
some significant  portion of assets also has the advantage  of reducing 
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pension fund's return and the S&P 500 Index.  On the other hand, 
indexation  has the disadvantage  that it puts many of the people allo- 
cating  the sponsor's  money  out of their  jobs, and  perhaps  for that  reason 
it has not spread  more widely. Moreover,  even with indexation  some- 
body must decide which indexes to hold. Those decisionmakers  then 
become vulnerable  to poor performance.  Giving greater  discretion to 
outside money managers  always leaves the treasurer's  office with an 
extra layer of people to blame. 
DIVERSIFICATION  ACROSS  STYLES.  The treasurer's office that allocates 
funds across money managers  must account  for its allocation  decisions 
to other parties inside the sponsor  organization.  It mostly cares about 
its performance  relative to that  of the other  sponsors  with whom it will 
be compared. In particular,  it is probably  eager to minimize any po- 
tential  performance  shortfalls  between  its performance  and  theirs. Even 
apart  from performance  tracking  error  per se, the treasurer's  office has 
an incentive not to pursue a strategy  that is too unorthodox.  Such a 
strategy  is more likely to be second-guessed  ex post. Finally, the trea- 
surer's  office wants  to pursue  a strategy  that  is sufficiently  sophisticated 
that it can justify the continued  existence of its empire. 
In practice, these factors move most TOs to diversify across money 
managers  with different investment  styles rather  than toward  either a 
single-minded  investment  strategy  or complete indexation.  For exam- 
ple, the treasurer's  office would want to put some of the money with 
value managers  because in some years value managers  do better and 
hence  if the TO does not invest with them  it might  have some explaining 
to do. Similarly, most sponsors  in recent years have tried to put some 
money  in small capitalization  stock funds  for fear that  they will be held 
responsible  for not doing so if such funds perform  well. Although  our 
data do not enable us to look at sponsor allocations, diversification 
across styles appears  to have been the virtually universal strategy of 
most large pension plans. Hence, even though  explicit indexation  may 
not have increased  recently, "closet indexation" of this type may be 
on the rise. 
Focus  ON THE PORTFOLIO-SELECTION  PROCESS.  The  third  important 
response  by the sponsor to the difficulty of predicting  the future per- 
formance of the money manager is to try harder  to understand  the 
investment  strategy that the manager  is pursuing. Sponsors listen to 
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they demand  frequent  and detailed discussions of portfolio choices as 
well as lists of stocks bought and sold. It is possible that  this focus on 
the actual  process of selecting stocks provides  sponsors  with additional 
information  that enables them to disentangle  past luck from manager 
skill and hence to improve manager  selection. But the apparent  fact 
that the portfolio performance  of pension funds is no better than that 
of mutual  funds, where most investors look only at past performance 
and do not get a chance to view the actual  portfolio-selection  process, 
suggests that  the added  information  is not being used to great  advantage. 
One  possible reason  for this is that  employees  of the treasurer's  office 
have hubris  about their ability to select superior  money managers  and 
investment  models. In essence, they may be frustrated  stock pickers. 
Alternatively, they may be excessively risk averse and always need a 
good story to explain poor performance  to their superiors  inside the 
sponsor  organization.  Money managers  who can provide a good story 
about  their strategy  have a comparative  advantage.  In fact, the product 
sold by the professional  money managers  is not just good performance 
but  schmoozing,  frequent  discussion  of investment  strategies,  and  other 
forms of hand holding. 
We can take this reasoning  further  in contrasting  the performance  of 
pension funds and mutual funds. Market forces select mutual fund 
money managers  purely on the basis of performance,  and hence the 
ones that  survive  are the ones that  perform  the best. In contrast,  market 
forces select pension fund managers not only on the basis of their 
performance.  They also consider  managers'  ability  to provide  sponsors 
with services such as well-defined  products  and hand holding and in- 
vestment approaches  that can be easily defended  ex post. As a result, 
pension  fund managers  must  be good at these activities. In fact, market 
forces may put  better  investors  in charge  of mutual  funds  than  in charge 
of pension funds. The importance  of these nonperformance-based  ob- 
jectives probably  explains why pension managers  offer highly differ- 
entiated  products, why they cannot expand a lot (the very top people 
need to spend time with the sponsors), and why their performance  is 
relatively poor. 
So far we have argued  that employees of the treasurer's  office may 
pursue objectives other than achieving good portfolio performance. 
They also may have hubris  about  their ability to pick good performers 
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performance  of the fund managers  they hire is so poor. After all, the 
money managers  could not on average have substantially  underper- 
formed  the S&P 500 by simply throwing  darts  and then schmoozing  to 
justify their mistakes. Random  portfolio selection does not reduce av- 
erage performance;  it only increases risk. To produce  this kind of in- 
ferior  performance  on average,  fund  managers  must  have systematically 
picked overpriced  stocks that had inferior  expected returns. 
One possibility is that many fund managers  simply trade  too much 
and at the wrong times so that they incur large market impact (or 
"execution") costs in addition to brokerage  commissions. Alterna- 
tively, pension managers  may gravitate  toward  groups of stocks that 
are simultaneously  overpriced  and yet easy to justify buying. For ex- 
ample, glamour  stocks such as Merck  or Wal-Mart  with proven  records 
of consistent earnings  growth may attract  fund managers  because no- 
body would ever doubt that these are "good" companies. The great 
demand  for these stocks by institutions  and  unsophisticated  individuals 
who equate profitability  with potential for capital gains makes them 
overpriced.  Nonetheless, fund  managers  who invest in these stocks may 
thrive  despite their  mediocre  performance  because  it is easy to schmooz 
and  smooth  over any  problems  when  you invest in such stalwarts.  Future 
research needs to identify these groups of  stocks that may explain 
underperformance  by fund  managers  yet are  chosen as part  of the desire 
of money  managers  and  employees  of the treasurer's  office to keep their 
jobs. 
Money Managers' Response 
The most important  response of the money managers to process 
evaluation  and more generally to the preference  of the sponsor orga- 
nization  for hand  holding  and  defensible  strategies  is to design strategies 
that appear  to be differentiated  but are at the same time highly con- 
ventional. 
PRODUCT  DIFFERENTIATION.  Diversification  across  styles  only  en- 
courages  product  differentiation,  even if fundamentally  the strategy  is 
not different  from what is already  available  in the marketplace.  Money 
managers  also spend  a great  deal of time discussing  their  strategies  with 
sponsors  and attempting  to persuade  them to give them money to man- 
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a track  record  is clearly part  of attracting  new money, and our consis- 
tency results suggest that track records may be justifiably important. 
But our evidence also suggests that the track  record  is only part  of the 
story and that there are other aspects to the products  that money man- 
agers are selling. 
Money managers  have been so successful at product  differentiation 
that it is no longer so easy to compare the performance  of different 
managers. Many fund managers  are now trying to convince sponsors 
that even though they underperformed  the S&P 500  they still did well 
because they outperformed  an index geared toward  their personal in- 
vestment  style (for  example, a growth-based  small  capitalization  index). 
As in any highly competitive product market, it is in the industry's 
interest to decrease competition through product differentiation  and 
subdividing  the market. Interestingly, 10 to 15 years ago in an envi- 
ronment  that  was arguably  less competitive, most money managers  just 
managed  balanced  funds that invested in both equity and fixed-income 
securities. Very few managers  explicitly marketed  themselves as spe- 
cialists. 
INVESTMENT  DISTORTIONS.  In addition to working on nonperformance 
margins  of designing  their  products,  money  managers  sometimes  distort 
their investment  behavior to impress sponsors. One commonly noted 
form of such behavior is, in fact, a direct response to detailed evalu- 
ations  of the money  managers'  portfolios.  Specifically,  money  managers 
are said to window dress their portfolios at the end of the year, which 
means getting rid of poorly performing  stocks that the sponsors  might 
take as independent  evidence of low ability. Using the performance 
database,  Lakonishok  and others found evidence that  window dressing 
does indeed take place, although  it does not appear  to be very costly 
to the sponsors.  13  Not surprisingly,  managers  respond  to the incentives 
created  by the close scrutiny  from the sponsors. 
Another, potentially much more important  investment  distortion  is 
the so-called lock-in strategy. This strategy is a direct response to 
relative  performance  evaluation  of money managers.  Money managers 
are said to lock in their gains when they are ahead of the Index by 
shifting  their  portfolio  to correspond  more  closely to the S&P  500. That 
way they will be ahead  of the Index  at the time of the evaluation  period. 
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Conversely, money  managers  are  said  to increase  their  risk, particularly 
the idiosyncratic  risk, when they are substantially  behind  the Index and 
in a desperate  attempt  to get ahead. We have done some preliminary 
analysis of the lock-in effect with the performance  database  and find 
that it is present in the data. Like window dressing, the lock-in effect 
is a natural  response of money managers  to the existing evaluation 
practices  and  the highly competitive  environment  in which  they operate. 
SUMMARY.  This section has attempted to present some of the features 
of the money  management  industry  as a response  to the agency  problems 
prevalent  in that industry.  We tried  to show that  the structure  and even 
performance  of this industry  can be understood  in terms  of these agency 
problems. Much of the empirical  evidence supports  this proposition. 
Discussion and Implications 
The picture  of the pension  fund  industry  that  our  analysis  has painted 
is not a positive one. As far as performance  is concerned,  pension fund 
equity managers  seem to subtract  rather  than add value relative to the 
performance  of the S&P 500 Index. There is some consistency of per- 
formance  that would enable a firm  to pick a better  money manager  on 
the basis of past performance,  but  even so it is not clear that  this money 
manager  would be able to beat the market. Much of the organization 
of the industry  seems to be driven  by its need to provide  sponsors  with 
good excuses for poor performance,  clear stories about  portfolio strat- 
egies, and other services that are related  only vaguely to performance. 
In fact, the multiple layers of agency relationships  and the orientation 
of this industry  toward  pleasing the treasurer's  office may be largely 
responsible  for its poor  performance  relative  to both  passive  benchmarks 
and the mutual  funds. 
It is hard to believe that this situation  has lasted for so long. One 
possible remedy  is a move toward  indexation  and  other  forms  of generic 
products,  which are provided  by low-cost, mass-market  suppliers  such 
as banks and insurance  companies. The recent move toward  defined- 
contribution  plans, in which individuals have more control over the 
allocation  of their  pension assets, is likely to accelerate  this trend  away 
from  servicing  and  answering  to the  treasurer's  office. This  move toward 
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Table 18. Asset Composition  of Top 1,000 Defined-Benefit  and Defined- 
Contribution  Plans, 1990 
Percent 
Defined- 
Asset  Defined-benefit  plans  contribution  plans 
Company  stock  ...  24.0 
Other  stock  43.6  15.8 
Fixed income  36.0  11.4 
Cash  8.7  8.7 
GIC/BIC  3.1  33.2 
Annuities  0.7  0.7 
Other  7.9  6.2 
Source: Pensionis  anid  Iinvestmnenits,  various issues. 
money management,  where money is allocated based on past perfor- 
mance rather  than on ex ante models and stories. The move toward 
defined-contribution  plans obviously facilitates this transition  toward 
the mutual  fund model, although  pensioners  first  must be convinced  to 
invest more in stock other than that of their own company  (table 18). 
But even the defined-benefit  plans should  have tried  to solve the agency 
problems inside the corporations  more efficiently and to use more ra- 
tional  portfolio-allocation  schemes. With  one trillion  dollars  of pension 
assets invested in equities, underperformance  by 1.5 percent a year 
costs sponsors  $15 billion that  go to the brokerage  industry,  the money 
management  industry, and the smart investors who trade against the 
funds. The pressure  to reduce these costs must eventually  bring about 
important  changes in the money management  industry,  but  the question 
is: how fast? Comments 
and Discussion 
Comment by Oliver Hart: The Lakonishok-Shleifer-Vishny  (hence- 
forth, LSV) paper  provides evidence showing that pension fund man- 
agers who invest in equity significantly underperform  the S&P 500 
Index. This is a striking  result since it suggests that  considerable  social 
gains could be achieved if large parts of workers' pension money in 
the United States were switched from active to passive management. 
There  are two ways to discuss a paper  like this. One is to try to find 
holes in the authors'  empirical  and statistical  methodology. The other 
is to take the authors'  results at face value and try to explain them. 
I am going to adopt  the second approach,  even though,  as the authors 
note, they have not established the significance of  fund managers' 
underperformance  beyond any doubt. In particular,  if different fund 
managers  choose the same investment  strategy,  then over the 1983-89 
period  there  are only seven observations,  and  underperformance  can be 
established only at the borderline significance level.  In contrast, if 
managers'  strategies  are  independent,  there  are  5,383 observations,  and 
underperformance  is clear-cut. 
For the remainder  of my discussion, I will take underperformance 
as established  and try to explain why it occurs and, in particular,  why 
it may persist. LSV argue that it is due to the extra level of agency 
between corporate  sponsors and money managers  in the form of the 
treasurer's  department.  I think that they are on to something  here, but 
that the truth may be a bit more complicated, for reasons that I will 
now explain. 
A useful starting point is to consider what a complete theory of 
underperformance-that  is, one that  starts  from  first  principles-would 
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look  like.  First,  it would  have to explain  why firms provide pensions 
at all.  In particular, why don't  workers save by themselves,  possibly 
by buying pensionlike  securities in the market place? I'm not sure that 
it is easy  to come  up with a completely  satisfactory  answer,  but pre- 
sumably the following  factors are important: (1)  firm-provided pensions 
are tax-favored; (2) they provide workers with an incentive to stay with 
the firm to the extent that the pension is not fully portable if the workers 
move;1 and (3) workers may not be confident of  their ability  to save 
an appropriate amount and may prefer to entrust this decision  to some- 
body else. 
Given that it is optimal for firms to provide pensions,  the next ques- 
tion to ask is: what kind of pension would we expect? The natural way 
to think of  this is in an optimal contracting framework.  That is,  it is 
useful to imagine the firm and worker sitting down when the worker is 
first hired and planning  out how  retirement benefits  should be deter- 
mined  along  with  wages.  Looking  at it this  way  makes  it clear  that 
there are many dimensions of retirement benefits that can be negotiated: 
the annual amount that workers and the firm should be paying in,  the 
level  of  benefit at retirement,  the degree  of  indexation  to the cost  of 
living,  and so on.  I do not know what an optimal contracting approach 
would  tell  us about the determination of  each of these  aspects  of  the 
pension  plan,  but it seems  worth finding out. 
Certainly,  it is not at all clear that the solution  to the optimal con- 
tracting problem  is  a defined-benefit  plan.  In fact,  I suspect-along 
with  the  authors-that  it is  more likely  to be  a defined-contribution 
plan.  Under a defined-benefit  plan,  workers are offered a fixed,  nom- 
inal-or  sometimes  real-wage  many years from now,  and it is  not 
clear why firms' shareholders have a comparative advantage in provid- 
ing  this  kind of  insurance  against  aggregate  nominal  or real income 
shocks.  Rather, we might expect workers to look for insurance, if that 
is what they want,  through the market. 
On the other hand, maybe the right type of insurance is not available 
in the market, and workers are so much more risk averse than share- 
holders that shareholders should provide the insurance anyway; partic- 
ularly if it is on actually unfavorable terms. I do not know how much 
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workers  get out of their  pension in practice,  but maybe  the equilibrium 
is that the firms do provide it, but the benefits are low relative to the 
contributions. 
Another  factor that might help to explain the use of defined-benefit 
plans is that the government  insures them, that is, it covers workers 
against losses in the event of firm  bankruptcy.  In contrast,  the govern- 
ment does not insure defined-contribution  plans. 
In any event, let us suppose  that  we can explain  defined-benefit  plans 
along the lines above. This means that the firm  has a future  obligation 
that  is fixed either  in nominal  or real terms. How should  the firm  invest 
so as to satisfy this obligation?  It seems reasonable  that the firm will 
invest in some mix of cash, bonds, and  equities, which is what  we find. 
But what mix? 
This question  is not discussed  in the paper.  Instead  the authors  focus 
just on the equity component.  The question  might  be pursued  in future 
work, however. In  particular,  it would  be nice to know  whether  sponsors 
are behaving in some reasonable  way in so far as moving in and out 
of shares is concerned, and also with respect to the division between 
shares and long-term  bonds. 
The authors'  main-and  striking-result is that  the  equity  component 
is dominated  by the S&P 500. How can we explain  this? This question 
can in turn be subdivided  into two: why did firms start investing in- 
efficiently in the first place? Given that they are doing it, why don't 
they stop? 
The first question does not seem so difficult to answer. Maybe, 
despite the huge literature  on efficient markets,  it has not been widely 
appreciated  until recently that "beating the market" is a bad strategy 
to pursue.  That  is, maybe firms'  workers  were happy  with the idea that 
some sophisticated  department  of professionals  was trying  to pick win- 
ners and, they thought, obtaining  a large return.  In fact, maybe that's 
what they think  even now. To put it another  way, maybe  the results of 
this paper are not yet well known and, once they become so, things 
will change. 
But maybe  they won't change  that  fast. Because the second question 
is: given that  sponsors  have invested  inefficiently  in the past, who would 
gain from eliminating  the inefficiency? 
This is where agency problems come in. Suppose, first, that the 
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whom does the residual  belong? It appears  that, legally, it belongs to 
the firm. LSV argue, however, that the firm's implicit contract with 
workers  may be such that  the excess effectively belongs to the workers. 
So the situation  is ambiguous  and it is useful to consider  the two cases 
separately. 
Assume first that the excess belongs to the firm. It seems clear that 
it is in shareholders'  interest  to switch to a better  investment  strategy. 
However, shareholders  are dispersed, and there is a principal-agent 
problem  between management  and them. 
As far as management  is concerned, if the firm's  profits  go up, then 
that is not bad, but maybe it is not terribly  good either. Maybe their 
incentive schemes are such that  they don't obtain  a large  direct  benefit. 
And maybe they are not interested  right now in having more cash to 
invest. 
As the authors  point  out, the firm's  treasury  department  would surely 
be against a move toward investing in something like the S&P 500 
Index, since many of them would lose their  jobs. 
Thus  the conclusion  is that  there  may  be no great  pressure  for change. 
Actually, it would be interesting  to know something  about  the order  of 
magnitude  of the gains from eliminating  the inefficiency for a typical 
firm. In particular,  if you took a large company, what would the gain 
be relative to the salaries of people in the treasury  department?  If the 
net gain is huge, it is harder  to explain why there is no change. 
The second case is where the excess funds belong to the workers. 
Here there seems even less reason to expect a change. Certainly  it is 
in the interest  of the workers  to move toward  index investing, but there 
are tremendous  collective action problems  unless the workers  are rep- 
resented  by a union. Management  cares even less than  before because 
their salary won't change and they won't have more money to invest. 
And the treasury  department  is against, as before. 
In fact, in some cases, management  may even prefer to have less in 
the pension fund. Suppose that, along the lines of Shleifer and Sum- 
mers,2  a raider  who takes over the firm feels no obligation to respect 
the implicit contracts  of incumbent  management  with workers.  Then a 
large  (overfunded)  pension  fund  will increase  the  probability  of a hostile 
bid since the raider  can seize the surplus, but, under  incumbent  man- 
2.  Shleifer  and  Summers  (1988). 384  Brookings Papers: Microeconomics 1992 
agement, the surplus  accrues to workers  rather  than shareholders.  An 
inefficient investment  strategy  may be a subtle way of throwing  some 
of this surplus  away, thereby  protecting  management  from a raid. 
So far I have been talking about  the case where the pension fund is 
overfunded.  Matters  are  very different  if there  is underfunding,  because 
then the firm is responsible  for the shortfall. That is, the obligation  to 
workers is a bit like debt, and, as we all now know, debt may be a 
good bonding device. So, under  these conditions, we might expect a 
lot more pressure  on the firm to invest efficiently. 
It would be interesting  to know if the data  reflect  a different  response 
to pension  investment  inefficiencies  for  firms  with  underfunded  pensions 
as opposed to those with overfunded  pensions. 
In summary,  I liked the paper  and  found the results  very interesting. 
I think that the authors'  agency explanation  of slack is plausible, but 
that they focused a little too narrowly  on the extra level of agency 
represented  by the treasury  department.  It seems to me that  the agency 
problems between management  and shareholders  and between man- 
agement  and workers  are even more important.  Another  nice aspect of 
the paper is that the authors are able to come up with an empirical 
measure  of slack. The literature  is full of references  to agency  problems, 
but  it has been surprisingly  difficult  to measure  agency  costs. This paper 
identifies these costs convincingly in a particular  context. 
Comment by George L.  Perry: Back in the 1930s, Keynes asked, 
"Why are  New York  bankers  so successful?" and  answered,  "Because 
they compete with New York bankers." Reading  their conclusions, I 
gathered  that Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny might update  this by 
changing  bankers  to pension fund managers.  One of my qualifications 
for discussing this paper  is that  my wife, Dina, has been a pension  fund 
manager. So I have to look for why the authors  are wrong. 
The authors  have an interesting  hypothesis as to why pension fund 
performance  may  be poor, and  it centers  on agency  problems  of a special 
sort. The way the industry  is organized,  corporate  professionals  (from 
what the authors  call the fund sponsor) are responsible  for allocating 
pension funds to managers, often with the help of consultants who 
advise in the choice of managers.  And managers  (by which the authors 
mean management  firms  rather  than individuals)  allocate funds in turn 
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that  these layers of supervision  impair  performance  by tilting portfolio 
managers  away from investing as wisely as possible and toward in- 
vesting in a way that can be justified to sponsors. 
My secondhand  impressions  are that such agency problems  are gen- 
uine. Both the need to review portfolio decisions with clients and the 
fact that performance  is evaluated  at frequent  intervals  may be coun- 
terproductive  under some conditions. The authors' hypothesis is not 
only plausible but even likely in the limited sense that these agency 
problems  subtract  from  the average  performance  of the industry.  I think, 
however, that the paper  falls well short  of proving  the following prop- 
ositions, offered  either  explicitly or implicitly:  that  these agency  effects 
are large enough that, in general, active pension fund management 
produces  no positive value for its clients; that past performance  does 
not provide clients with a basis for picking individual  managers  who 
can be expected  to outperform  the average  manager  by enough  to justify 
their fees; and that, therefore,  the industry  cannot  continue  to exist in 
its present form. 
The authors'  central  empirical  finding-that,  as an industry,  active 
pension  fund  management  has  underperformed-seems well established 
for the 1982-89 period  for which they have data  comparing  funds with 
the  S&P  500 Index. Whether  measured  over  one- or  three-year  intervals, 
the S&P 500 outperforms  the average of funds most of the time. The 
main  problem  is the length  of the data  period. It is so short-just  seven 
years of performance-that  it may be unrepresentative,  possibly be- 
cause of the growth of index funds over those years. In fact, one of 
the authors,  Andrei  Shleifer, showed  that  individual  stocks experienced 
abnormal  positive returns  when they were added  to the S&P 500. More 
to the point, Jim Bates, an experienced  money manager,  has told me 
of a study showing that over the five-year  period  when indexing grew 
in popularity,  being in the S&P added 2 percent  to 3 percent  per year 
to a company's stock price compared  with the stock of an objectively 
similar  company that was not in the index. 
It is  not hard to see a self-fulfilling prophecy at work here. As 
indexing grew in popularity,  starting  in the early 1980s, demand  tilted 
toward  stocks that were in the index. This made those stocks perform 
especially well, which made indexing  look good, which attracted  more 
money into indexed funds. I used to think  there  was something  to this, 
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for explaining  why the industry  did not keep up with the S&P over this 
entire  period. That  table indicates  that  the popularity  of indexing  shows 
no trend after 1987. Yet the S&P outperformed  in 1988-89 as well as 
in the earlier  years. 
There  could be other factors  justifying below average  performance. 
For example, one could imagine that clients were willing to give up a 
little average  return  in the belief that active expert  management  would 
avoid extreme bad outcomes and that managers  invested accordingly. 
The paper,  however, suggests that  the funds did not perform  that  func- 
tion particularly  well. Table 2 shows that  in 1987, the year of the great 
crash, the S&P 500 Index outperformed  the equally weighted fund 
average by 1.2 percentage  points, which would have put it in the 61st 
percentile of funds. In 1990, the only year of decline in the sample, 
the fund average  fell 1.5 percentage  points  more  than  did the S&P 500. 
Thus, attaching special weight to avoiding especially bad outcomes 
does not seem to be an explanation  for mediocre  average  performance 
in the industry. 
That still leaves the fact that the period is probably  too short to be 
conclusive. Results  based  on it could be unrepresentative.  For  example, 
the S&P outperformed  indexes of smaller  capitalization  stocks by wide 
margins  over this period. It is fair to ask why fund managers  did not 
figure out that this was a bad period for small stocks. But some funds 
in the authors' data may have been committed  to smaller stocks and 
thus have had no choice. A comparison  with mutual  funds in the table 
below suggests this may have been an unusual  period. The S&P 500 
outperformed  general  equity  mutual  funds  between 1983 and 1989, even 
though studies of some earlier periods have shown mutual  funds kept 
up with or bettered  the broad  averages. 
Whatever  the explanation  for average  fund performance  in this pe- 
riod, average performance  is not what matters  the most for answering 
the authors' questions about the industry's organization. A sponsor 
seeks the best manager  rather  than  the average, so the authors'  analysis 
of whether  the sponsor can hope to find above average performers  is 
more  to the point. Some versions  of efficient  market  theory  would reject 
that  possibility a priori.  Richer  versions, first  associated  with Grossman 
and Stiglitz, allow for some net returns  to applying  time and brains  to 
stock picking. The authors  obviously believe it is an empirical  question 
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Table 1.  Annual Performance  of Equity Mutual Funds, 1983-89 
Percent 
Appreciation  of  Average  Total  return 
general  equity  dividend  of general  equity  S&P 500 
Year  mutual  funds  yield  mutual  funds  return 
1983  21.2  4.4  25.6  22.5 
1984  -  1.3  4.6  3.4  6.3 
1985  28.0  4.3  32.2  32.2 
1986  14.1  3.5  17.6  18.5 
1987  0.7  3.1  3.8  5.2 
1988  15.1  3.6  18.7  16.8 
1989  24.4  3.5  27.9  31.5 
Mean  14.6  3.9  18.4  19.0 
Sources: Annual appreciation  is from Lipper  Analytical Services, and it is an unweighted  average of the return  on all equity 
mutual  funds existing between 1980 and 1991. The average  dividend yield is for S&P 500 companies, and it is from Economic 
Indicators.  The S&P 500 return  is from the authors'  table 2. 
The authors'  main tool for analyzing  the performance  of individual 
managers  is the transition  probabilities  for managers  grouped  by quar- 
tiles. Comparing  ranking  one year with rankings  the next shows little 
consistency. In fact, there was some negative serial correlation  with 
one year's bottom quartile  outperforming  all others  the next year. But 
looking at three-year  performance,  which surely increases  the skill-to- 
luck ratio, gives fairly  clear  evidence  that  past  performance  is positively 
related  to future  performance.  The relation  is particularly  apparent  for 
the top quartile  of fund  managers,  although  the rank  order  between  past 
and future is maintained  for the collection of all funds and for each 
category of funds when they are grouped  by investment  style. 
The authors  do not go on to refine their analysis of transition  prob- 
abilities by looking for optimal filters. Thus, they do not tell us what 
might be the best cut-off point for choosing managers  or even how the 
top 10 percent  of managers  fared in subsequent  years or how long the 
top managers  stay above average. There is clearly a lot of reversion 
toward  the mean in the three-year  interval  comparisons  using quartiles 
that  the authors  provide. It would be interesting  to know how it looked 
using performance  deciles, or, more  important,  how much  consistency 
there would be if longer periods of performance  were used. But the 
authors'  data period is too short to answer such questions. I believe 
there  are studies  of mutual  funds  that  show statistically  significant  good 
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Most discussions of performance  stress  the likely importance  of luck 
or noise, and researchers  try hard to avoid biases from these sources 
that might overstate  the role of skill. But there is reason  to believe the 
authors'  data  have an important  bias in the other  direction,  understating 
the investment skills of some individual managers. The data are or- 
ganized by management  firm rather  than by individual  manager.  The 
trouble is investment stars often get bid away to other firms or leave 
to start  managing  on their own. As a result, the authors'  data will not 
capture  many of the best track  records  of individual  managers.  Yet in 
terms of the big question of the paper, a sponsor  can hope to keep its 
money in the hands of a star performer  even as she moves from one 
management  firm to another. 
All this tells me the authors'  prediction  of the death of the pension 
fund management  industry as we know it is not warranted  by their 
results. Sponsors  have good reason to look for superior  managers  and 
can be guided by past performance  in their search. But they do need 
to be careful  that  they are  getting  the real  thing. The performance  record 
built by one individual will probably  not predict the performance  of 
her successor at the same firm. In short, good individual  managers  are 
worth finding and hiring. Dina would not let me come to any other 
conclusion, but neither  does the data. 
Finally, let me offer some thoughts  to justify the personal  attention 
dimensions of pension fund management  that the authors  treat as an 
unambiguous  disadvantage.  They reason  that  there  are two dimensions 
to the job: managing  money and  justifying what  you do to your clients. 
By having  to choose people who are  good at  both  managing  and  shmooz- 
ing, one gets poorer  portfolio results than if one chose on the basis of 
managing  alone. That sounds right, and it probably  helps explain why 
some charming  managers  with poor track  records  are still in business. 
But in my experience most really good managers  like their work and 
are good at talking about it, so there is no necessary trade-off at the 
high-performance  end of the spectrum.  What is more, having money 
managed  by people the sponsor trusts and can talk to can add to per- 
formance by helping the sponsor avoid all-too-human  investing mis- 
takes. In particular,  whether  to be in stocks at all may matter  more for 
performance  than what stocks to be in. A really great manager  might 
have gotten out of stocks in August 1987. But a good manager-one 
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the shmoozing  that  the authors  believe can be only counterproductive- 
might have been invaluable simply by convincing the sponsor not to 
abandon  stocks after the Monday  crash in October. 
General Discussion: Several participants  attempted  to explain the au- 
thors' finding  that pension fund managers  have consistently  performed 
less well than has the S&P 500 Index since the early 1980s. Although 
generally  accepting  the authors'  conclusion  that  agency  problems  played 
some role in this outcome, many participants  felt that this explanation 
was not adequate. 
George  Borts said that  portfolio  risk must  also be an important  factor 
affecting pension  fund  returns.  He suggested  that  lower yield managers 
are providing  lower risk to their  clients. The firms  that  provide  pension 
fund management  services to corporations  also manage  university  en- 
dowment funds, Borts noted, adding that the universities  continue to 
use these managers  even though index funds seem to provide higher 
returns.  He wondered  if gathering  information  about  risk  characteristics 
of funds would help to explain the authors' findings on inferior per- 
formance  by money managers. 
Peter Reiss said that the tax-exempt  status of pension funds should 
not be overlooked when trying to explain this apparent  pension fund 
underperformance.  He suggested that tax-exempt status might allow 
fund managers  to pursue sophisticated  tax arbitrage  strategies. As an 
example, he pointed  out that  at one time money  managers  were  claiming 
that they could arrange  dividend-capture  schemes. 
Richard Schmalensee suggested that data problems might be re- 
sponsible for the results found in the paper. Schmalensee noted that 
the difference in performance  between money managers  and mutual 
funds is critical to the paper's argument,  but this comparison  is not 
made using the same time period. He said that the periods must be 
matched  somehow before the authors'  conclusions can really be solid. 
Sam Peltzman noted that the authors' examination  of the pension 
fund  management  business begins in the early 1980s, after  the conclu- 
sion of a period  of rapid  growth  for this industry.  He argued  that  when 
the authors'  study began, it would have been difficult for a sponsor  to 
tell which firms were really successful because rapid  growth makes a 
firm's track record very hazy. He suggested that much of what was 
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authors  was a kind of "sorting out." Peltzman  said that  the movement 
of funds  toward  managers  with good three-year  track  records  and  toward 
index funds was a reasonable  response to the general situation  in the 
money management  industry. 
After noting that defined-contribution  pension plans use an extra 
agency level compared  with defined-benefit  plans, Margaret  Blair sug- 
gested that  examining  these two kinds of plans separately  should  be an 
adequate  test for the authors'  agency cost hypothesis. 
Joseph  Farrell  was surprised  by the authors'  claim that corporations 
that sponsor  pension funds seem to diversify across fund management 
styles, buying into a combination  of growth, yield, and value funds. 
He said that the benefit  of buying into such managed  funds is lost once 
diversification  takes place; that is, diversification  is an indirect  way of 
buying  the whole S & P 500,  less the fees charged  by the fund  managers. 
Alan Krueger  noted  that  unions  can effectively act as agents  for their 
members  in union-managed  pension  funds. He was interested  in know- 
ing what kinds of investment  strategies  unions are using and whether 
they are moving toward  defined-benefit  or defined-contribution  plans. Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny  391 
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